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ABSTRACT 
  
The central theme of this dissertation is to understand the socioeconomic consequences 
associated with the technological breakthroughs in the U.S. energy landscape. The dissertation 
combines econometric methods with spatial techniques to identify the externalities in water and 
energy transport arising from the recent shale energy boom. The three essays focus on various 
aspects of influences on real estate market, wastewater management, and highway traffic safety, 
with each contributing to a broad picture of the overall costs and benefits of the fracking revolution. 
All the analyses indicate that despite the enormous economic benefits the negative externalities 
associated with pipeline and truck transport have resulted in additional social and environmental 
costs. Specifically, in the first essay, we focus on the extent to which the existence of oil and gas 
pipelines and the related incidents elevated mortgage lenders’ risk perceptions and affected their 
lending and securitization decisions. We show a permanently lower origination rate by 1.9% in the 
pipeline-present areas compared to the pipeline-free areas, which was further enlarged by 1.8% 
whenever pipeline incidents happened. Moreover, lenders’ risk management strategies differed by 
borrowers’ income and evolved with the tightening of the securitization market. In the second 
essay, we focus on analyzing how unconventional drilling and production techniques could affect 
oil and gas wastewater production. We find that horizontal wells drilled in shale regions after 2010 
produced an increasingly larger amount of wastewater at the initial stage of production compared 
to vertical wells with the difference decreasing over production age regardless of the cohort years. 
However, we find that unconventional wells have a lower lifespan cumulative wastewater and a 
higher production efficiency regarding the wastewater-to-energy ratio. In the third essay, we 
examine the effects of the fracking-related trucking on fatal crashes using evidence from North 
Dakota. A Poisson estimation shows that an additional post-fracking well within six miles of a 
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road segment not only increased the count of fatal crashes involving large trucks by 7.5% but also 
intensified the crash severity. Moreover, wells’ post-fracking transport increased the incidence of 
daytime crashes during both rush and non-rush hours but not nighttime crashes. Finally, evidence 
suggests that the increased accidents were due to a higher traffic volume rather than a higher 
accident rate or risky driving behaviors. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
  
The U.S. oil and gas production has undergone substantial increases since the late 2000s. From 
2007 to 2017, crude oil production nearly doubled while natural gas production increased by 37%.1 
In particular, tight oil production made up 54% of the U.S total in 2017 (U.S. Energy Information 
Administration (EIA), 2018), while shale gas gross withdrawals by 2016 had been more than seven 
times higher than its baseline level in 2007 with its share in total natural gas withdrawals growing 
from 8% to over 50% over the period.2 The successful extraction of oil and gas from shale rocks 
relies on two principle technologies - high-volume hydraulic fracturing (“fracking”) and horizontal 
drilling. While the innovative combination of the two technologies has triggered the large-scale 
development of unconventional oil and gas resources nationwide, concerns about the associated 
environmental and social costs have caused states such as New York and Maryland and many local 
governments to ban fracking (Burnett and Weber, 2014). This dissertation aims to understand the 
effects of the technological innovations and the associated infrastructure boom on real estate 
market, water resources and road safety. 
Although the United States has experienced multiple oil and gas booms in the past century, 
energy production has never been as controversial as today. Compared with conventional methods, 
                                                 
1 Data source: U.S. Energy Information Administration monthly crude oil and natural gas production data. 
See more at  https://www.eia.gov/petroleum/production/  
2 Data source: U.S. Energy Information Administration annual shale gas production data. See more at   
https://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/ng_prod_shalegas_s1_a.htm  
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the fracking technology employed to extract shale oil and gas are more resource-intensive, as a 
well may require up to six million gallons of water to crack open shale rocks (U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency, 2016). The intensive water requirement may result in regional water stress and 
competition with water users in the agriculture and municipal sectors (Jaffe, 2014; Freyman, 2014; 
Gallegos et al., 2015; Horner et al., 2016). Moreover, as a substantial portion of the injected water 
eventually returns to the surface, the chemicals contained in wastewater may lead to environmental 
pollution and health consequences if not appropriately treated (Veil et al., 2004).  
Besides the water-intensive and disruptive nature of the technology itself, the associated 
energy and water transport activities also affect the overall quality of life as thousands of wells are 
drilled on people’s private land onshore in the lower 48 states. Since the shale energy boom, both 
the volume and the mileage of energy pipeline transport has increased significantly, while truck 
use also grew in quantity and intensity in response to the increased transport demand for drilling 
equipment and fracking-related water. In the meantime, transport-related incidents such as pipeline 
spills, leaks, fire and explosion, and fatal traffic crashes soared subsequently.3 These incidents not 
only resulted in life and property damage and loss but also generated substantial environmental 
and social cost due to inefficient risk management and resource allocation.  
Understanding the net gains and losses of the U.S. shale energy boom is essential for both 
policymakers and the public to design and support appropriate policies. Unfortunately, due to the 
fast growth of drilling activities and the absence of experience, local governments usually lack 
effective methods to address the emerging issues, while the public perception is easily swayed by 
                                                 
3 See the two reports on the website of Fractracker Alliance in 2014 and 2016 at 
https://www.fractracker.org/2014/09/truck-counts/ and https://www.fractracker.org/2016/11/updated-
pipeline-incidents/  
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anecdotal and unrepresentative evidence. Failure to identify the pattern of unconventional energy 
production and the associated environmental risks would exacerbate the existing issues. However, 
simply banning fracking may lead to loss of royalties and tax revenue and higher energy prices 
borne by consumers (Burnett and Weber, 2014). As shale oil and gas production is projected to 
grow in both share and absolute volume (EIA, 2018), it is imperative to establish the causal 
inference underlying the controversies and shed light on risk management strategies and policy 
responses.   
In the past decade, both industry-funded researchers and the academic community has been 
active in investigating the local consequences of shale energy production. The former applies the 
Input-Output model to estimate the economic impacts of oil and gas extraction on gross revenues, 
employment, and tax revenues. A non-exclusive list of examples includes the Center for Business 
and Economic Research (2008), Considine et al. (2009), Scott and Huang (2009), Weinstein and 
Clower (2009), Considine, Watson, and Blumsack (2010), Considine, Watson, and Considine 
(2011). Moreover, exploiting the technological shift in fracking and horizontal drilling interacted 
with local geology as an instrumental variable, researchers estimate the economic gains of the 
fracking revolution on income and employment (Weber, 2012; Feyrer, Mansur, and Sacerdote, 
2017). Researchers also present evidence against the hypothesis of “Natural Resource Curse” from 
the recent shale energy boom (Allcott and Keniston, 2017; Weber, 2014; Fetzer, 2014; Maniloff 
and Mastromonaco, 2014; Brown, 2014).  
Regarding the environmental consequences of the fracking boom, the focus of the current 
discussion lies in the water quality issue and the associated pollution and health concerns. While 
engineering studies directly analyze the chemicals of fracking-related wastewater (Osborn et al. 
2011; Warner et al. 2013a, 2013b, 2014; Darrah et al. 2014; Harkness et al., 2015), economists 
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estimate the housing prices depreciation to quantify people’s perceived environmental risks of 
drilling and fracking activities (Gopalakrishnan and Klaiber, 2013; Weber, Burnett, and Xiarchos, 
2014; Muehlenbachs et al., 2015). Researchers also show evidence of deterioration in the quality 
of life or total amenities by estimating people’s willingness-to-pay for the fracking-induced loss 
in local amenities (Bartik, Currie, Greenstone and Knittel, 2016). A very recent study by Currie, 
Greenstone, and Meckel (2017) demonstrates the potential health impacts of fracking through a 
greater incidence of low-birth-weight babies identified near the fracking sites.  
Despite the abundant literature investigating the economic benefits and the environmental 
costs directly related to drilling and fracking, little attention has been paid to the externalities 
stemming from the transport activities in oil and gas extraction. Although these activities occur 
upstream or downstream of energy production, the unique technology and production pattern of 
shale energy extraction determines that these activities could lead to severe local consequences as 
well. This dissertation consists of three stand-alone essays to test and understand the externalities 
arising from water and energy transport during the shale energy boom.  
The first essay is entitled “Environmental Hazards and Mortgage Credit Risk: 
Evidence from Texas Pipeline Incidents.” This essay attempts to examine the impacts of pipeline 
hazards on home mortgage lenders’ lending and securitization decisions in the real estate market. 
Specifically, we use a difference-in-difference model to test the permanent differences in mortgage 
credit access between the pipeline-present and the pipeline-free Census tracts and the additional 
differences when pipeline incidents occurred. Built upon the literature on the effects of natural and 
manmade disasters on people’s risk perceptions of environmental hazards, this essay focuses on 
the perspective of home mortgage lenders who are more sensitive to information and own richer 
resources to evaluate and manage the potential risks. This essay further demonstrates how lenders’ 
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risk management strategies differed by borrowers’ income and evolved with the tightening of the 
securitization market. The empirical evidence obtained confirms the expected concerns of lenders 
about pipeline risks, which specifically expands the scarce literature concerning mortgage lenders’ 
risk perceptions related to environmental contamination.  
The second essay is entitled “Do Unconventional Oil and Gas Wells Generate More 
Wastewater? A Lifespan Perspective.” While the question has been discussed in engineering 
studies, the available evidence is limited in two critical dimensions. The first limitation is that few 
researchers consider the effects of wells’ age or cohort year, which are essential to understand how 
the production pattern varies over a well’s lifespan and evolves across time. The second limitation 
is that most previous studies are regional case studies without considering the heterogeneity in 
geology and well configuration. This essay provides the first comprehensive and accurate 
quantification of wastewater generation using nationwide well-level energy and wastewater 
production data. The difference-in-difference-in-differences analysis shows that unconventional 
wells are more efficient concerning both lifetime volume and production efficiency despite the 
higher initial wastewater production. The findings challenge the perceptions that unconventional 
techniques lead to more wastewater while pointing out where the real concerns lie in. The cyclical 
pattern of wastewater production identified in this essay are informative for policymakers to design 
more effective regulations to manage wastewater in shale development.  
The third essay is entitled “Fraccidents: The Impact of Fracking on Road Traffic 
Deaths.” Built upon the second chapter, this essay further examines how the unique wastewater 
production pattern related with fracking has affected truck transport and intensified the accident 
externality. Exploiting the monthly variations in a well’s spud and completion dates, this essay 
estimates changes in fatal crash count due to the exogenous timing of well operations within a 
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buffer area of a road segment. A fixed-effect Poisson estimation shows that an additional post-
fracking well increased the crash count and the accident severity. Moreover, wells’ post-fracking 
transport increased the incidence of daytime crashes during both rush and non-rush hours but not 
nighttime crashes. Evidence suggests that the potential mechanism that underlies the phenomenon 
was through a higher traffic volume rather than a higher accident rate or risky driving behaviors. 
This essay not only reveals the hidden costs of truck transport borne by the energy boomtowns but 
also sheds new light on risk management strategies for operators and local governments to manage 
the threats of fracking-induced trucking to road safety. 
This dissertation contributes to the debate about shale energy development by providing 
evidence of its socioeconomic consequences in home mortgage lending, wastewater management, 
and traffic safety. The results will be of interest not only to policymakers interested in designing 
management practices to alleviate the socioeconomic costs of energy development, but also to 
economists interested in finding what drove the rising number of accidents related to fracking. The 
findings of this dissertation may provide new insight as to whether fracking is to blame for the 
growing health and safety concern and whether further regulatory efforts should be implemented 
to limit the technology in future energy development. 
  
7 
 
1.1 References 
Allcott, H. and Keniston, D., 2017. Dutch disease or agglomeration? The local economic effects 
of natural resource booms in modern America. The Review of Economic Studies, 85(2), 
pp.695-731.  
Bartik, A.W., Currie, J., Greenstone, M. and Knittel, C.R., 2016. The local economic and welfare 
consequences of hydraulic fracturing. 
Brown, J.P., 2014. Production of natural gas from shale in local economies: a resource blessing 
or curse? Economic Review-Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, p.5. 
Burnett, J.W. and Weber, J.G., 2014. Is the Natural Gas Revolution all its Fracked Up to Be for 
Local Economies? Choices, 29(4). 
Center for Business and Economic Research, 2008. Projecting the Economic Impact of the 
Fayetteville Shale Play for 2008-2012. 
http://www.aogc.state.ar.us/sales/FayettevilleShaleEconomicImpactStudy2008.pdf  
Considine, T.J., Watson, R. and Blumsack, S., 2010. The economic impacts of the Pennsylvania 
Marcellus shale natural gas play: an update. The Pennsylvania State University, Department 
of Energy and Mineral Engineering. 
Considine, T.J., Watson, R.W. and Considine, N.B., 2011. The economic opportunities of shale 
energy development. The Manhattan Institute, June 28. 
Considine, T., Watson, R., Entler, R. and Sparks, J., 2009. An emerging giant: Prospects and 
economic impacts of developing the Marcellus shale natural gas play. University Park, PA: 
The Pennsylvania State University, Dept. of Energy and Mineral Engineering. August. 
Currie, J., Greenstone, M. and Meckel, K., 2017. Hydraulic fracturing and infant health: New 
evidence from Pennsylvania. Science advances, 3(12), p.e1603021. 
8 
 
Darrah, T.H., Vengosh, A., Jackson, R.B., Warner, N.R. and Poreda, R.J., 2014. Noble gases 
identify the mechanisms of fugitive gas contamination in drinking-water wells overlying the 
Marcellus and Barnett Shales. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 111(39), 
pp.14076-14081. 
Feyrer, J., Mansur, E.T. and Sacerdote, B., 2017. Geographic dispersion of economic shocks: 
Evidence from the fracking revolution. American Economic Review, 107(4), pp.1313-34. 
Fetzer, T., 2014. Fracking growth. 
Freyman, M., 2014. Hydraulic fracturing and water stress: water demand by the numbers. A Ceres 
Report.  
Gallegos, T.J., Varela, B.A., Haines, S.S. and Engle, M.A., 2015. Hydraulic fracturing water use 
variability in the United States and potential environmental implications. Water Resources 
Research, 51(7), pp.5839-5845.  
Gopalakrishnan, S. and Klaiber, H.A., 2013. Is the shale energy boom a bust for nearby residents? 
Evidence from housing values in Pennsylvania. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 
96(1), pp.43-66.  
Harkness, J.S., Dwyer, G.S., Warner, N.R., Parker, K.M., Mitch, W.A. and Vengosh, A., 2015. 
Iodide, bromide, and ammonium in hydraulic fracturing and oil and gas wastewaters: 
environmental implications. Environmental science & technology, 49(3), pp.1955-1963. 
Horner, R.M., Harto, C.B., Jackson, R.B., Lowry, E.R., Brandt, A.R., Yeskoo, T.W., Murphy, 
D.J. and Clark, C.E., 2016. Water use and management in the Bakken shale oil play in North 
Dakota. Environmental science & technology, 50(6), pp.3275-3282. 
9 
 
Jaffe, M, 2014. When drought occurs, fracking and farming collide. The Denver Post. February 
9, 2014. http://www.denverpost.com/business/ci_25089583/when-droughtoccurs-fracking-
and-farming-collide . 
Maniloff, P. and Mastromonaco, R., 2014. The local economic impacts of hydraulic fracturing 
and determinants of dutch disease. Colorado School of Mines, Division of Economics and 
Business Working Paper, 8. 
Muehlenbachs, L., Spiller, E. and Timmins, C., 2015. The housing market impacts of shale gas 
development. American Economic Review, 105(12), pp.3633-59. 
Osborn, S.G., Vengosh, A., Warner, N.R. and Jackson, R.B., 2011. Methane contamination of 
drinking water accompanying gas-well drilling and hydraulic fracturing. proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences, 108(20), pp.8172-8176. 
Scott, L.C. and Huang, J., 2009. The economic impact of the Haynesville shale on the Louisiana 
economy in 2008. Prepared for the Louisiana Department of Natural Resources. 
U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2018. Annual energy outlook 2018. Washington, DC: 
U.S. Office Energy Analysis, Department of Energy. 
https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/aeo/pdf/AEO2018_FINAL_PDF.pdf  
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. 2016. Hydraulic fracturing for oil and gas: Impacts from 
the hydraulic fracturing water cycle on drinking water resources in the United States. 
Washington, DC: Office of Research and Development. 
https://cfpub.epa.gov/ncea/hfstudy/recordisplay.cfm?deid=332990   
Veil, J.A., Puder, M.G., Elcock, D. and Redweik Jr, R.J., 2004. A white paper describing 
produced water from production of crude oil, natural gas, and coal bed methane (No. 
ANL/EA/RP-112631). Argonne National Lab., IL (US).  
10 
 
Warner, N.R., Christie, C.A., Jackson, R.B. and Vengosh, A., 2013a. Impacts of shale gas 
wastewater disposal on water quality in western Pennsylvania. Environmental science & 
technology, 47(20), pp.11849-11857. 
Warner, N.R., Kresse, T.M., Hays, P.D., Down, A., Karr, J.D., Jackson, R.B. and Vengosh, A., 
2013b. Geochemical and isotopic variations in shallow groundwater in areas of the Fayetteville 
Shale development, north-central Arkansas. Applied Geochemistry, 35, pp.207-220. 
Warner, N.R., Darrah, T.H., Jackson, R.B., Millot, R., Kloppmann, W. and Vengosh, A., 2014. 
New tracers identify hydraulic fracturing fluids and accidental releases from oil and gas 
operations. Environmental science & technology, 48(21), pp.12552-12560. 
Weber, J.G., 2012. The effects of a natural gas boom on employment and income in Colorado, 
Texas, and Wyoming. Energy Economics, 34(5), pp.1580-1588. 
Weber, J.G., 2014. A decade of natural gas development: The makings of a resource curse?. 
Resource and Energy Economics, 37, pp.168-183. 
Weber, J., Burnett, J. and Xiarchos, I., 2014. Shale gas development and housing values over a 
decade: evidence from the Barnett Shale.  
Weinstein, B.L. and Clower, T.L., 2009. Potential economic and fiscal impacts from natural gas 
production in Broome County, New York. Retrieved October, 15, p.2009. 
 
  
11 
 
CHAPTER 2 
ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS AND MORTGAGE CREDIT RISK:  
EVIDENCE FROM TEXAS PIPELINE INCIDENTS 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The rapidly rising number of pipeline incidents in recent years has called public attention to 
pipeline hazards. In the past decade, there have been 6,313 pipeline leaks, spills, and other 
incidents, leading to 145 fatalities, 614 injuries and over 4,398 million dollars in property damage.4 
Although most pipelines are constructed in rural areas, a growing population is exposed to the 
hazards due to urban sprawl over the years. In addition to immediate harm to life and property, 
pipeline incidents generate a negative and persistent externality on housing prices (Simons 1999; 
Simons, Winson-Geideman and Mikelbank 2001; Hansen, Benson and Hagen 2006), and often 
result in environmental contamination in the neighborhoods involved (Islam et al. 2016; Matheny 
2016; Medina 2016). Both housing prices drop and the potential environmental hazards pose a 
direct threat to the value of properties nearby, which increases the risks of mortgage lending to 
these neighborhoods. The purpose of this study is to examine how the existing pipeline 
infrastructure and the associated incidents impact mortgage lenders’ perceptions of environmental 
risks and thus affect their lending and securitization decisions.  
                                                 
4 Data Source: Authors’ calculation using the data from the United States Department of Transportation 
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration. The original data are available at 
https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/pipeline/library/data-stats   
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Mortgage lenders view environmental hazards as top concerns among a myriad of external 
risk factors when evaluating potential lending profitability. Their reservations first stem from the 
potential impairment of the collateral, which may occur right after contaminants are discovered 
and persist in the long run due to environmental stigma damages (McCluskey and Rausser 2001 
and 2003). Moreover, borrowers’ repayment ability could also be weakened by the costs associated 
with required investigation and remediation (Davis and Levy 2012). The presence of 
environmental hazards thus increases the credit risk of the borrowers with limited financial 
viability. More importantly, under the current environmental laws, lenders themselves may be held 
liable for the entire cleanup of the contaminated sites in many circumstances. For example, the 
federal Superfund statute protects a foreclosing lender from the direct environmental liabilities if 
the lender makes commercially reasonable efforts to sell the property at the earliest practicable 
time. Despite the broad statutory protection, bright-line rules such as a fixed period for subsequent 
sale are absent for this safe harbor, which creates uncertainties for lenders seeking both the 
exemption protection and the optimal time to sell the foreclosed property in a challenging market 
(Ahrens and Langer 2008; Gracer and Leas 2008). Moreover, as petroleum-related contamination 
is not covered by the Superfund exemption protection, it poses a particular concern to lenders 
dealing with oil pipeline hazards, in which case lenders could be subject to the liability imposed 
by other state and federal laws.  
Perceiving the potential environmental risks and uncertainties, lenders may avoid or at least 
limit the number of loans involving contaminated properties (Davis and Levy 2012). However, 
when the expansion of mortgage securitization enabled lenders to transfer the credit risk easily to 
investors in the secondary market, lenders may choose to originate the risky loans and package 
them for securitization (Jimenez and Saurina 2006; Dell’Ariccia, Igan and Laeven 2012; Keys, 
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Seru and Vig 2012; Simkovic 2013). Such originate-to-distribute model prevailed before the Great 
Recession when the secondary market was full of private financial institutions (Berndt and Gupta 
2009; Purnanandam 2011). Compared with private securitizers, the Government-Sponsored 
Enterprises (GSEs) have always been maintaining prudent guidelines towards the hazards from oil 
and gas storage and pipeline transportation that affect the properties securing the loans.5 As private 
mortgage securitization virtually disappeared after the Great Recession, the secondary market was 
dominated by the GSEs, which was accompanied with a sharp tightening of underwriting standards 
during the same time (Simkovic 2013). Considering the marketability of the loans after the crisis, 
lenders could adjust their risk management strategies accordingly in response to the evolution of 
securitizers’ guidelines.  
In this study, we empirically investigate mortgage lenders’ risk perceptions of pipelines 
using evidence from the 2005-2011 Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) loans in Texas. 
Texas has the largest pipeline infrastructure in the United States with more than 439,771 miles of 
pipelines representing roughly one-sixth of the total pipeline mileage of the entire country 
(Railroad Commission of Texas 2017). We focus on the nonmetropolitan (“nonmetro”) Census 
tracts of Texas where pipeline infrastructure is more concentrated and pipeline failures occur more 
frequently compared to the metropolitan (“metro”) areas. A considerable number of these loans 
are from lenders that do not have any physical branches in the nonmetro counties where the 
collateral securing the loan is located, because lenders with branches only in the nonmetro areas 
are exempt from the HMDA data reporting requirements (Igan, Mishra and Tressel 2012). 
                                                 
5 See more at https://www.fanniemae.com/content/guide/servicing/d1/1/01.html  
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Focusing on these loans enables us to observe lenders’ risk-taking in a context of severe 
information asymmetry between lenders and borrowers (Xu and Zhang 2012). 
We employ a difference-in-difference (DID) method to estimate the effects of pipeline 
infrastructure and the related incidents on mortgage lending. We define all the Census tracts where 
pipelines exist as the treatment group (“pipeline-present areas”) and the Census tracts free of any 
pipeline infrastructure as the control group (“pipeline-free areas”). We exploit the exogenous 
variations in the timing, location, and the associated property damage to estimate the treatment 
effects of pipeline incidents. The DID model measures the effects of pipeline infrastructure by the 
permanent difference in lenders’ credit decisions between the treatment and the control groups. It 
further captures the treatment effects of pipeline incidents by the relative change in the credit 
outcomes between the two groups across the years with versus without any incidents.  
We find that an average mortgage loan in the pipeline-present areas was 1.9% less likely 
to be originated compared to that in the pipeline-free areas after controlling for borrowers’ 
creditworthiness and demographic characteristics. We interpret the permanent group difference in 
credit availability from two aspects. First, we find that the denied loans in the treatment group 
were 3.2% more likely to be rejected due to insufficient collateral, which suggests that lenders 
perceived the properties in the pipeline-present areas as having lower collateral value. Second, we 
identify that the permanent difference in the origination rates emerged only among the low- to 
middle- income borrowers but not among the upper-income borrowers. The results indicate that 
the differential lending behaviors also resulted from lenders’ concerns about borrowers’ ability to 
repay a loan in case of remediation costs required for environmental contamination.  
We find that the difference in the origination rates between the pipeline-present and the 
pipeline-free areas was further enlarged by 1.8% whenever an incident happened. We find no 
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evidence showing that the severity of property damage of the incidents affected lenders’ credit 
decisions, which implies that it could be the information shock rather than the actual damages of 
the incidents that increased lenders’ risk perceptions. Another possibility could be that lenders 
were not informed of the real loss promptly because the investigation and public disclosure usually 
takes time. Meanwhile, we find that the average loan amount in the pipeline-present areas did not 
change after the incidents, which suggests that immediate property depreciation in the affected 
neighborhoods could be minimum. We interpret the declined origination rates as lenders’ response 
to the uncertain future costs of bearing the direct environmental liabilities. We find that such 
temporary change in lending behaviors disappeared one year after, which is consistent with the 
findings that lenders’ uncertainties would diminish as cleanup was completed and regulatory 
compliance was achieved (Jackson 2001). Again, the treatment effects of incidents emerged only 
among the low- to middle-income borrowers. We run a series of robustness checks to rule out the 
possibility that risky borrowers sorted to the pipeline-present areas after the incidents, as we find 
no simultaneous changes in borrowers’ creditworthiness, demographic composition, or any 
confounding risk factors observed by lenders in the incidents-affected areas. Nor do we find any 
evidence of cumulative sorting based on the density of pipeline infrastructure and the frequency 
of pipeline incidents.  
To investigate how the ease of securitization has affected lenders’ risk management for 
different segments of the population, we split the baseline sample into subsamples by the years 
before, during, and after the late 2000s subprime mortgage crisis as well as by the income of 
borrowers. We find that before the Great Recession lenders managed pipeline hazards in a passive 
way by taking actions only after observing real incidents. Specifically, they denied the low- to 
middle-income borrowers and sold the originated loans from the upper-income borrowers to the 
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GSEs when incidents happened. Our findings suggest that the GSEs were able to screen the loans 
by the observable signals such as borrowers’ income when they could not discern the localized 
environmental risks. We also find that after the crisis lenders started to lower the origination rates 
in the pipeline-present areas especially among the low- to middle-income borrowers. The findings 
suggest that the tightened securitization market during this period forced lenders to manage 
pipeline risks more aggressively by avoiding the properties exposed to pipeline hazards 
systematically.  
This study complements and extends the studies on how natural or man-made disasters 
have affected people’s risk perceptions of environmental hazards (Nelson 1981; Gamble and 
Downing 1982; Michaels and Smith 1990; Kolhase 1991; Kiel 1995; Carroll et al. 1996; Pope 
2008; Naoi, Seko and Sumita 2009; McCoy and Walsh 2014). Existing studies focus on the 
information asymmetry in environmental risks between sellers and buyers in the housing market, 
covering a broad range of topics such as earthquakes, toxic waste sites, nuclear power plants, 
chemical plants, incinerators, landfills, flood zones, and wildfire hazards. Highly publicized 
incidents or public information disclosure, serving as exogenous information shock, could 
significantly increase buyers’ marginal willingness-to-pay for the distance from the hazardous 
sites. Our study adds a novel perspective of the mortgage market where lenders are more sensitive 
to information and own richer resources to evaluate environmental conditions and manage the 
potential risks. The empirical evidence obtained in the study confirms the expected concerns of 
lenders about pipeline risks, which expands the scarce literature concerning mortgage lenders’ risk 
perceptions related to environmental contamination (Healy and Healy 1992; Wilson and Alarcon 
1997; Worzala and Kinnard 1997; Bond et al. 1998; Jackson 2001).  
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2.2 Empirical Method   
We investigate mortgage lenders’ potential reactions in both lending and securitization activities 
to measure their perceived risks of pipeline hazards. First, we expect lenders to decrease the 
probability of originating loans exposed to pipeline risks. Instead, they are more likely to deny the 
loans or conditionally approve the loans. In the latter case, the conditionally approved loans are 
subject to final verification such as initial inspection, property appraisal, and other stipulations 
before they move on to final approval.6 Alternatively, lenders may transfer the credit risk in their 
portfolio to the secondary market by securitizing the mortgages subject to pipeline hazards. They 
could sell the originated loans to either the GSEs or private institutions that purchase and package 
loans for sale to investors (Simkovic 2013). In summary, we investigate four potential outcomes 
for each loan, including the likelihoods of being originated and denied, the probability of being 
sold to any purchasers in the secondary market, and the particular prospect of being sold to the 
GSEs. In the last two circumstances, we focus on the loans that have already been originated by 
lenders. 
We treat the existence of pipeline infrastructure as a potential hazard and thus define all 
the Census tracts with the presence of pipeline infrastructure as the treatment group. Then we 
define the remaining Census tracts where no pipelines have been built as the control group. We 
start the analysis from estimating the following linear probability model: 
(1) 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑝𝑖𝑝𝑒𝑗 + 𝛽2𝑝𝑖𝑝𝑒𝑗 ∗ 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑗𝑡 + 𝛾𝐱𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜑𝐳𝑗𝑡 + 𝐿𝑖 + 𝐶𝑗 + 𝑌𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡                      
where  𝑖  indexes individual loan, 𝑗  indexes Census tract, and 𝑡  indexes year. The dependent 
variable 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡  is the discrete credit outcome for loan 𝑖 , the treatment indicator 𝑝𝑖𝑝𝑒𝑗  denotes 
                                                 
6 See more at https://www.ffiec.gov/hmda/faqreg.htm#action  
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whether any pipeline goes through Census tract 𝑗, 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑗𝑡 indicates whether any pipeline incident 
happens in Census tract 𝑗 of year 𝑡, and 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡  is the individual-specific error term. This model 
controls for a vector of individual-specific covariates, 𝐱𝑖𝑗𝑡 , a vector of Census tract-level 
characteristics, 𝐳𝑗𝑡 , lender fixed effects, 𝐿𝑖 , county fixed effects, 𝐶𝑗 , and year fixed effects, 𝑌𝑡 . 
Thus, our findings are not driven by different business models of lenders, any time-invariant 
county-level characteristics, or any common economic shocks to the whole market in a given year. 
The coefficient 𝛽1  captures the average difference in the credit outcomes of individual loans 
between the treatment and the control groups, which is referred to as the permanent effects of 
pipeline infrastructure. The coefficient 𝛽2  measures any additional difference across the two 
groups whenever pipeline incidents occur, which is referred to as the incident effects.  
 
2.3 Data 
2.3.1 Home Mortgage Data 
We get access to the information regarding home mortgage lending activities from the Home 
Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data, which are maintained by the Federal Financial 
Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC). The HMDA data cover both depository institutions 
(banks, savings associations, and credit unions) and non-depository institutions (for-profit 
mortgage lending institutions), as long as they meet the reporting criteria, such as whether the total 
assets of the institution exceeded the coverage threshold and whether the institution had a branch 
or office in a metropolitan statistical area (MSA) on the preceding December 31.7 Berkovec and 
Zorn (1996) estimate that the lenders covered by the HMDA constitute roughly 80% of the total 
                                                 
7 For more information see https://www.ffiec.gov/hmda/reporter.htm  
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U.S. mortgage originations. These covered lenders are required to report their credit decisions on 
every mortgage loan they receive, the loan amount, the location of the property tied to the loan up 
to the Census tract level, the borrowers’ characteristics, and the type of purchasers if the loan is 
sold in the same calendar year.  
In this study, we focus on all the depository institutions covered by the HMDA, which 
differ systematically from the non-depository institutions in that the former obtain funds mainly 
through accepting deposits from the public and are usually subject to more rigorous regulatory 
scrutiny. We limit the sample to the conventional, one to four-family, owner-occupied, and first-
lien home purchase loans. With these restrictions, all the loans in our sample fall below the Federal 
Housing Finance Agency’s (FHFA) conforming loan limits for Texas of each year. We also 
exclude the loans from the applicants who are not natural persons, such as a business and a 
corporation or partnership, which can be identified by the absence of the applicants’ demographic 
characteristics. Further, we drop the loan applications withdrawn by the applicants or closed due 
to incompleteness, and the loans whose preapproval request were denied by the financial 
institutions or approved but not accepted by the applicants. Finally, we exclude the loans purchased 
by an institution to avoid double-counting, since these loans were reported by both the originating 
institution and the purchasing institution (Dell’Ariccia, Igan and Laeven 2012). 
Each loan in our final sample falls into one of the following three statuses: (1) originated, 
(2) denied by the financial institutions in the current calendar year, (3) approved but not accepted. 
The HMDA codes a loan as status (2) if the borrower has supplied all the necessary information 
but fails lenders’ creditworthiness conditions. Instead, if the borrower has met the creditworthiness 
conditions but fails any other requirements, such as clear-title requirements and acceptable 
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property survey, which leads the loan not to be consummated, then the loan is coded as status (3).8 
We examine the first two statuses to identify the change in the likelihoods of the loans being 
originated and denied. Thus, the difference between the treatment effects on these two outcome 
variables reflects the effect on the probability of the loans being approved by lenders but not 
accepted by borrowers.  
The HMDA requires lenders to document up to three reasons for each denied loan 
voluntarily. These reasons could be borrowers’ ineligibility in the debt-to-income ratio, 
employment history or credit history, insufficient collateral or cash, unverifiable information, 
incomplete credit application, and denied mortgage insurance. In particular, the debt-to-income 
ratio would be indicated as a denial reason if the applicant had insufﬁcient income for the amount 
of credit requested or had excessive obligations in relation to income. Employment history would 
be indicated if the applicant had temporary or irregular employment. Insufficient collateral value 
would be indicated if the applicant did not have sufficient type or value of collateral determined 
by the appraisal of a qualified expert.9 In our sample, lenders reported at least one denial reason 
for 79% of the denied loans. We define a set of denial reason dummies for each specific reason 
according to whether the reason was reported among one of the three denial reasons provided by 
the lender. Thus, we can compare the reasons for the denied loans from the pipeline-present areas 
with those from the pipeline-free areas across the years with versus without pipeline incidents. 
The HMDA further indicates whether a loan is sold in the same calendar year if the loan 
has been originated. Although the precise identity of the purchasing institution is not provided, the 
                                                 
8 See more at https://www.ffiec.gov/hmda/faqreg.htm#action  
9 See more explanations at https://www.ffiec.gov/hmda/pdf/2013guide.pdf    
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HMDA data report whether the purchaser is private or government-owned or sponsored. 
Therefore, we consider an originated loan to be sold to the secondary market if a purchaser type 
can be identified in the HMDA data. Moreover, according to whether the purchaser is Fannie Mae 
(FNMA), Ginnie Mae (GNMA), Freddie Mac (FHLMC) or Farmer Mac (FAMC), we can identify 
whether the loan was sold to the GSEs. 
We collect additional individual- and Census tract-level information from the HMDA data. 
Specifically, we control for the loan amount and the applicant’s annual gross income in $10,000’s, 
gender, race, ethnicity, and the presence of co-applicants. Also, we take into account Census tract-
level time-variant characteristics based on the borrowers’ geography, including population density 
and median family income in $10,000’s, and time-invariant characteristics including minority 
population percentage, the number of owner-occupied units, and the number of 1- to 4-family 
units.  
 
2.3.2 Pipeline Infrastructure and Pipeline Incidents 
Our measure of pipeline infrastructure is based on the shapefiles of pipelines provided by the U.S. 
Energy Information Administration. Figure 1 illustrates the geographic locations of major 
pipelines that transport crude oil, hydrocarbon gas liquids, natural gas, and petroleum products in 
Texas. In the figure, we use the 2003 Rural-Urban Continuum Code to distinguish the nonmetro 
areas from the metro areas. By comparison, 86% of the nonmetro Census tracts are covered by 
pipelines, while this percentage in the metro areas is only 52%. Moreover, the average length of 
pipelines in the nonmetro Census tracts is more than eight times as long as that in the metro Census 
tracts. We also identify the geographic locations of the petroleum refineries in Texas using the 
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shapefiles provided by the U.S. Energy Information Administration.10 We calculate the distance 
from the centroid of each Census tract to the nearest operable petroleum refineries in Texas to 
control for the impact of refinery facilities, which could otherwise confound the permanent effects 
of pipeline infrastructure. 
Our measure of pipeline incidents is obtained from the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials 
Safety Administration (PHMSA) of the U.S. Department of Transportation. The data contain 
records for the full universe of incidents reported by the operators of federally-regulated and state-
regulated natural gas and hazardous liquid pipelines. For each reported incident, the PHMSA 
records the date, location, causes, and consequences regarding fatality, injury, and total property 
damage. These incidents take the form of leak, rupture, spill, ignition, or explosion and could be 
caused by multiple reasons. Among all the pipeline incidents that occurred in Texas from 2005 to 
2011, 26% were caused by corrosion failure, 29% by equipment failure, 12% by excavation 
damage, 7% by incorrect operation, 10% by material or weld failure, 3% by natural force damage, 
5% by other outside force damage, and the remaining 7% were caused by other unrecorded 
reasons. 
Since the HMDA use Census tract identifiers from the Census 2000 series for the mortgage 
data from 2005 to 2011, we project the locations of all the incidents with non-missing geographic 
coordinates over this period onto the 2000 Texas Census tract map. Then we calculate the number 
and the associated property damage of the incidents at the Census tract level, which is the lowest 
geographic level that can be identified in the HMDA data. Figure 2 illustrates each Census tract’s 
total property damage over the seven years. By comparison, the average financial loss due to 
                                                 
10 The data are available at https://www.eia.gov/maps/layer_info-m.php     
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pipeline incidents in the nonmetro Texas is nearly eleven times as much as that in the metro areas, 
which is consistent with the distribution pattern of the pipeline infrastructure across the two 
regions.  
 
2.3.3 Sample 
In this study, we limit the sample to the nonmetro Texas to obtain more precise estimates of the 
effects of pipeline hazards. We construct a pooled cross-sectional dataset for the loans in 746 
Census tracts of 174 nonmetro counties from 2005 to 2011. Each observation represents an 
individual loan application in one year, containing information on lender’s credit decisions, the 
existence of pipeline infrastructure, the history of pipeline incidents in the Census tract where the 
mortgaged property is located, and the other individual- and Census tract-level characteristics.  
In total, we identify 315 pipeline incidents taking place in 160 nonmetro Census tracts 
during the sampling period. Figure 3 plots the annual counts of the incidents and the inflation-
adjusted total property damage for each year over the sampling period. The annual frequency of 
pipeline incidents ranges from the minimum of 33 in 2008 to the peak of 58 in 2009. Meanwhile, 
the total financial loss varies from 3.25 million dollars in 2006 to 116.5 million dollars in 2005, 
which is highly correlated with the severity of the incidents in each year. 
Table 1 reports the summary statistics by the treatment and control groups. On average, the 
treatment group had a lower loan origination rate by 1.3 percentage points, a higher loan denial 
rate by 1.8 percentage points, a lower share of loans sold to the secondary market by 6.1 percentage 
points, and a lower share of loans sold to the GSEs by 4.4 percentage points. By comparison, while 
5.9% of the mortgaged properties in the treatment group were affected by pipeline incidents, the 
24 
 
proportion in the control group was only 0.1%. Meanwhile, compared to the average property 
damage of $101,036 in the treatment group, the financial loss in the control group was almost 
trivial. The extremely rare incidence and the minor property damage reflect the spillover effects 
from the adjacent Census tracts, which could happen when oil or gas spills or other contaminants 
migrate from the pipeline-present neighborhoods to these pipeline-free areas.11 In our model, we 
ignore the spillover effects to the control group so that the estimates should be interpreted as a 
lower bound of the true treatment effects. 
Next, comparing borrowers’ creditworthiness and demographic characteristics across the 
two groups, we find that borrowers’ loan amount and annual gross income in the treatment group 
was higher than that in the control group by $11,820 and $10,100, respectively. However, the 
average loan-to-income ratio of 1.75 in the treatment group was slightly lower than the average of 
1.82 in the control group. Also, 49% of the borrowers in the treatment group had co-applicants, 
which was higher than the percentage in the control group (46.1%). Moreover, the treatment group 
had a lower share of Latinos by 8.2 percentage points and whites by 0.2 percentage points. It also 
had a higher portion of male applicants by 2.6 percentage points and blacks by 0.4 percentage 
points.  
We further show that the two groups differ from each other in the Census tract-level 
characteristics. By comparison, the pipeline-present areas featured a lower population density and 
a lower percentage of minority population. Besides, the pipeline-present areas had a higher Census 
tract median family income of $47,710 compared to the average of $44,480 in the pipeline-free 
                                                 
11 We identify one Census tract in Stephens County that does not have any pipeline infrastructure but once 
experienced oil spill due to tank overfill in 2010. 
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areas. The treatment group also had more owner-occupied units and more 1- to 4- family units, 
which were higher than the average of the control group by 28% and 25%, respectively. Finally, 
on average the Census tracts in the treatment group are located closer to the petroleum refineries 
(110 km) relative to those in the control group (127 km).  
Given the different observable characteristics between the treatment and the control 
groups, we use a difference-in-difference model to take into account the permanent difference in 
the credit availability across the two groups. We also control for a rich set of covariates to address 
the concerns about the omitted variable bias. Moreover, we demonstrate the common trends in the 
observable characteristics across the two groups over the years with versus without pipeline 
incidents to show that the estimated treatment effects are not confounded by the changes in 
borrowers’ creditworthiness or demographic composition.  
 
2.4 Baseline Results 
We begin by estimating the effects of pipeline infrastructure and pipeline incidents on lenders’ 
credit decisions using equation (1). Results are presented in Table 2. The dependent variables are 
whether a loan is originated (Column 1), whether it is denied (Column 2), whether a loan is sold 
to the secondary market if it has been originated (Column 3), and whether it is sold to the GSEs 
(Column 4). In the last two cases, we restrict the sample to all the originated loans. All standard 
errors are clustered at the Census tract level. 
The main coefficients of interest in Table 2 include the effects of pipeline infrastructure, 
i.e., the coefficient of the treatment dummy 𝑝𝑖𝑝𝑒𝑗, and the treatment effects of new incidents, i.e., 
the coefficient of the interaction term 𝑝𝑖𝑝𝑒𝑗 ∗ 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑗𝑡. The coefficient of the treatment dummy in 
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Column 1 indicates that a permanent difference existed in the origination rates between the 
treatment and the control groups, all else being equal. On average, an average loan in the pipeline-
present areas was less likely to be originated by 1.9%, and the estimate is statistically significant 
at the 1% level. In Column 2, the likelihood of the loan being denied in the treatment group was 
higher by 1.3% at the significance level of 5%. Since the loans that failed to be originated could 
be either denied or approved but not accepted, the difference in the absolute value of the estimates 
between Column 1 and Column 2 indicates the effects on the probability of the loan being 
conditionally approved. Next, the coefficients of the interaction terms in the first two columns 
show that whenever new incidents happened lenders further decreased the likelihood of originating 
the loans in the affected Census tracts by 1.8% and increased the likelihood of denying the loans 
by 1.7%. Both estimates are statistically significant at the 5% level.  
In Column 3 and Column 4, we restrict the sample to all the originated loans to examine 
the sales of the loans to the secondary market. The coefficient of the treatment dummy in Column 
3 indicates that the loans originated in the pipeline-present areas were 1.8% less likely to be sold 
in the securitization market at the significance level of 5%. In Column 4, although the probability 
of being sold to the GSEs was slightly lower by 0.5% for the loans in the treatment group, the 
estimate is statistically insignificant. Next, the positive signs of the interaction terms in the two 
columns suggest that when new incidents happened lenders tended to sell more originated loans 
in the affected areas for securitization, but the evidence is statistically insignificant.  
The coefficients of the control variables in Table 2 are consistent with our expectation. For 
example, the loans from those who were male and white and those who had a higher annual gross 
income and a lower loan-to-income ratio were significantly more likely to be originated, while the 
loans from the Latino and black applicants were less likely to be originated. Meanwhile, the 
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likelihood of a loan being originated is also positively correlated with some Census tract-level 
characteristics such as population density and median family income at the significance level of 
1%. The estimated coefficients of the control variables in Column 2 show a consistent pattern, 
taking the opposite signs compared to those in Column 1. 
We also estimate the marginal effects of the monetary loss in pipeline incidents by 
replacing the incident dummy, 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑗𝑡, with the total property damage for each Census tract in 
equation (1). The estimates of the permanent group difference in the four credit outcomes are 
consistent with the results in Table 2.12 However, we do not identify strong evidence showing 
significant marginal effects of the property damage on individual loans’ credit outcomes, which 
indicates that lenders did not base their credit decisions on the severity of the incidents. Compared 
with the findings in Table 2, our results suggest that it could be the information shock itself rather 
than the salience of the incidents that affected lenders’ risk perceptions. However, as it usually 
takes weeks or even months to investigate an incident and disclose the results to the public, lenders’ 
weak response to the real loss of the incidents could also result from the delay in information 
disclosure.  
 
2.5 Timing of The Incidents   
2.5.1 Before and After an Incident 
We expect that the current and the lagged status of pipeline incidents could have effects on lenders’ 
credit decisions while the future incidents should not. If the leads of the treatment were 
significantly different from zero, then the common trends assumption would be violated. It would 
                                                 
12 We do not report the estimation results due to space limit. The table is available upon request.  
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suggest that there could be unobservable factors correlated with the occurrence of pipeline 
incidents that explained lenders’ credit decisions. Thus, we add one lead and one lag of the 
interaction term to equation (1) and estimate the model using the data from 2006 to 2010.  
In Table 3, the lead terms are statistically insignificant across the four columns, which 
indicate that within one year before the incidents there was no additional significant difference in 
the mortgage credit availability between the treatment and control groups. Hence, lenders’ 
changing credit decisions in the years when pipeline incidents occurred were less likely to be 
driven by factors other than the exogenous shock of the incidents. Moreover, although the 
occurrence of pipeline incidents significantly affected the likelihoods of the loans being originated 
and denied in the treatment group, we do not identify any significant persistent effects on lenders’ 
credit decisions following the incidents. The lag terms of the incidents are statistically insignificant 
across all the columns, which means that the incidents shock quickly died out one year after. The 
short-lived incidents effects are likely to result from lenders’ uncertainties about the post-incident 
remediation responsibility and costs, which would diminish as long as the cleanup liability is 
assigned. Jackson (2001) has similar findings that remediation status has a statistically significant 
effect on lenders’ risk perceptions for a contaminated property. In his study, the percentage of 
lenders that would not provide a mortgage loan due to excessive environmental risks decreases 
from 93.2% before the cleanup to 4.2% by the time when the remediation has been completed.    
 
2.5.2 Early versus Late Incidents 
In the baseline analysis, we aggregate the loan applications and the pipeline incidents to the annual 
observations at the Census tract level, since the exact credit decision date is not available in the 
public HMDA data. However, since pipeline incidents could happen across all the months of a 
29 
 
year, those occurred later of the year would only affect a portion of the loans issued that year. 
Thus, the analysis on an annual basis would result in underestimates of the true effects of pipeline 
incidents. In this section, we demonstrate the potential bias by comparing the effects of the 
incidents that happened at the beginning of each year with the baseline treatment effects.  
Specifically, we only include the Census tracts that experienced the first pipeline incident 
as early as in the first quarter of the year while excluding the Census tracts that had their first 
incident later than March. We expect these early incidents to affect most of the loans issued during 
the year and result in the estimated treatment effects closer to the true effects. Since the PHMSA 
data only report the date for the incidents occurred before 2010, we run the robustness check using 
the sampling period of 2005-2009. In Table 4, we report the treatment effects of both the incidents 
that happened in the first quarter of the year (Panel A) and those that happened at any time of the 
year (Panel B). We find that the former generates a treatment effect of a larger magnitude on the 
likelihood of a loan being originated (-3.2%) compared to the latter (-1.9%). Consistently, the 
treatment effect from the early incidents on the loans’ denial rate (2.9%) is also larger in magnitude 
than the effect estimated using the whole set of the incidents (2.2%). Meanwhile, the early 
incidents were also more influential on the likelihood of selling an originated loan to the GSEs 
compared to the average effect of all the incidents (4.2% versus 1.5%).  
 
2.5.3 No Evidence of Sorting 
The baseline results suggest that lenders further adjusted their lending decisions whenever new 
incidents happened on top of the permanent difference in the credit availability between the 
pipeline-present and the pipeline-free areas. Our explanation is that lenders denied the risky loans 
due to the elevated risk perceptions following the incidents. In this subsection, we rule out the 
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possibility that the pool of potential borrowers in the treatment group could have changed after the 
incidents when less creditworthy borrowers sorted to the pipeline-present neighborhoods. Due to 
the limitation of the HMDA data, we cannot observe all the factors contributing to a borrower’ 
creditworthiness (Munnel et al. 1996). However, we can make use of the available characteristics 
of the borrowers and the loans in the dataset to test all the potential consequences of sorting that 
could be observed by us. Our robustness checks also help to exclude the possibility of sorting 
caused by borrowers’ unobservable features that are correlated with the observable measures of 
their creditworthiness.  
 
2.5.4 Borrowers’ Characteristics 
We first test the relative changes in the creditworthiness and the demographic characteristics of 
the borrowers in the treatment group when pipeline incidents happened compared to the trend in 
the control group. Specifically, we replace the dependent variables of equation (1) with borrowers’ 
individual-level characteristics, including loan amount, annual gross income, the loan-to-income 
ratio, the presence of co-applicants, gender, ethnicity, and race, taking into account the same set 
of Census tract-level characteristics, lender fixed effects, county fixed effects, and year fixed 
effects. While we allow the existence of a permanent difference between the treatment and the 
control groups, we expect that new incidents did not lead to further changes in these characteristics. 
In Table 5, we do not find any significant permanent group difference in either the creditworthiness 
or the demographic features of the borrowers except that the average loan amount and annual gross 
income of the borrowers in the treatment group was significantly higher by $10,150 and $9,340 
respectively than that in the control group. Moreover, when new incidents happened, there was no 
further change in the average quality of borrowers in the areas affected by the incidents. Our 
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findings indicate that the pool of borrowers in the years when pipeline incidents happened was not 
significantly different from that in the incidents-free years, which provides evidence for the 
common trends of the covariates. The results support that the treatment effects were unlikely to be 
caused by the changes in the creditworthiness or the demographic composition of borrowers after 
the incidents. 
 
2.5.5 Loans’ Denial Reasons 
Another concern is that the treatment effects could also be confounded by factors that are 
unobservable to researchers but correlated with lenders’ credit decision. For example, lenders 
could deny the loans from those risk-loving borrowers who are willing to bear the environmental 
hazards in the neighborhoods affected by pipeline incidents. In this subsection, we make use of 
the denial reasons provided by the HMDA data to cast light on the changes in the unobservable 
characteristics of borrowers in the incidents-affected areas. We restrict the sample to all the denied 
loans to which lenders provided at least one denial reason. Then we re-estimate equation (1) by 
replacing the dependent variable with a dummy indicating each denial reason to examine the 
change in the likelihood of the loans being rejected for each particular reason when pipeline 
incidents happened.  
In Table 6, we only find weak evidence in Column 2 showing that lenders were more likely 
to reject the loans for the reason of employment history by 2.1% when pipeline incidents occurred 
at the significance level of 10%. This evidence indicates that the occurrence of pipeline incidents 
led lenders to be more cautious about the borrowers who had temporary and irregular employment. 
Although some of these borrowers might show decent current income, lenders concerned more 
about the uncertainties embedded in the unstable employment that could affect borrowers’ ability 
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to make regular payments over the whole term of a loan. Compared to the insignificant change in 
the likelihood of denying a loan for the reason of the debt-to-income ratio (Column 1), our findings 
suggest lenders’ worries in the borrowers’ repayment ability in the long run rather than in the short 
term when environmental hazards are identified. 
Across all the other columns, we do not find any significant change in the likelihood of 
denying the loans for any other reason in the incidents-affected areas. For instance, Column 1 
shows that there was no significant change in the likelihood of the loans being rejected due to 
unqualified debt-to-income ratio, which suggests that the risk preference of borrowers in the 
treatment group did not change disproportionally when pipeline incidents occurred compared to 
that of the control group. In Column 4, we find that the denied loans in the treatment group had 
3.2% higher likelihood of being rejected due to insufficient collateral value at the significance 
level of 5%. The results indicate that systematic difference in housing values could exist between 
the treatment and the control groups, part of which could be attributed to the easement and 
restrictions on land titles and the inconvenience brought about by the utility services from pipeline 
operators. However, we find no further change in the probability of the loans being rejected due 
to insufficient collateral value when real incidents occurred, which suggests that collateral 
depreciation did not happen right after the incidents. The robustness check helps rule out 
simultaneous changes in the unobservable factors such as borrowers’ risk preference and 
immediate housing devaluation that could affect lenders’ credit decisions when pipeline incidents 
happened.  
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2.5.6 Cumulative Sorting Effects 
Since the occurrence of pipeline incidents usually signals the insecurity of pipeline infrastructure 
in a neighborhood, the history of pipeline incidents could gradually shape the potential 
homebuyers’ risk perceptions towards the neighborhood in the long run. If the lower origination 
rates of the loans in the pipeline-present areas were caused by the selection of risky households 
into these communities, then the selection problem would be more severe in the Census tracts of 
higher intensity of pipelines, since historically pipeline incidents could have happened more 
frequently in these areas. Likewise, the selection issue would also be more noticeable in the Census 
tracts with higher frequency of pipeline incidents over a given period, since more regular and 
intense incidents could send stronger signals to the potential homebuyers seeking less attractive 
neighborhoods.   
In this subsection, we test whether it is the cumulative sorting effects that explain our 
baseline results. First, we split the pipeline-present areas by the length of pipeline infrastructure in 
each Census tract into four quartile groups. In Table 7, we examine the observable characteristics 
of both borrowers and neighborhoods across the pipeline-free Census tracts and the first and the 
fourth quartile groups for all the loans from 2005 to 2011. We report the mean characteristics for 
each group in Columns 1-3 with the standard deviation in parenthesis. We also compare the 
characteristics between the pipeline-free areas and the first quartile group and between the first 
and the fourth quartile groups respectively, reporting the difference with the 𝑝-value in parenthesis 
for an unpaired two-sample mean-comparison 𝑡-test in Column 4 and Column 5. If sorting existed, 
we would identify riskier borrowers in the pipeline-present areas and especially in the higher 
quartile group where pipeline infrastructure was more intense. However, we do not find any 
evidence of sorting during this period. For example, the 𝑡-test results in Column 4 show that the 
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loans in pipeline-free areas had a higher loan-to-income ratio indicating higher credit risk. 
Moreover, the applicants in the first quartile group were more likely to be black and less likely to 
be white, but they were more likely to live in the neighborhoods featuring a lower minority 
percentage, a higher Census tract median family income, more owner-occupied units, and more 1- 
to 4- family units. Next, the 𝑡-test results in Column 5 show that borrowers in the fourth quartile 
group had a significantly higher loan amount and annual gross income but had a loan-to-income 
ratio statistically comparable to that in the first quartile group. They also had a higher likelihood 
of having co-applicants and living in more favorable neighborhoods. All the available measures of 
borrowers’ creditworthiness indicate that the borrowers in the upper quartile group turned out to 
be less risky than those in the group with a lower intensity of pipelines.  
We further categorize all the Census tracts by the total number of pipeline incidents that 
they encountered from 2005 to 2011 into four groups, in which the Census tracts did not experience 
any incident (Column 1), experienced one incident (Column 2), two incidents (Column 3), or three 
or more incidents (Column 4), respectively.13 If homebuyers did select themselves to less attractive 
neighborhoods in response to the signals sent by the incidents over the seven years, then by the 
end of the period riskier homebuyers would have gradually sorted to the communities where 
incidents occurred more frequently. In Table 8, we examine the same set of features across the 
four groups for all the loan applications in 2011, which is the last year of our sampling period. We 
report the mean characteristics for each group in Columns 1-4 with the standard deviation in 
                                                 
13 We also split the Census tracts by the quartile of their total property loss from pipeline incidents between 
2005 and 2011. We obtain similar conclusions as we get from Table 8. The results are available upon 
request.  
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parenthesis. We also report the difference of the characteristics between the incidents-free Census 
tracts and the areas with one incident as well as the difference between the Census tracts with one 
incident and those with three or more incidents in Column 5 and Column 6 respectively with the 
p-value for the 𝑡-test in parenthesis. Again, we do not find strong evidence of sorting. For example, 
the 𝑡-test results in Column 5 indicate that the average loan amount and borrowers’ annual gross 
income in the Census tracts with one incident were significantly higher than those in the incidents-
free areas while the loan-to-income ratios were statistically indistinguishable across the two 
groups. Moreover, the borrowers in the one-incident group were more likely to be male, white, 
and had a co-applicant. They also had a higher chance of living in the neighborhoods with a lower 
population density and minority percentage, a higher median family income, and more owner-
occupied units and 1- to 4- family units. Next, the 𝑡-test results in Column 6 indicate that the 
borrowers in the one-incident group and the three- or more-incidents group were statistically 
similar in terms of loan amount, annual gross income, the loan-to-income ratio, and the presence 
of co-applicants. While the neighborhoods in the Census tracts with three or more incidents had a 
higher minority percentage, we do not find strong statistical evidence showing that the two groups 
had significantly different median family income. Above all, the evidence indicates that the loans 
in the areas experiencing more frequent incidents were not riskier than those with less or none 
incidents at the end of the period of 2005-2011.  
 
2.6 Heterogeneous Treatment Effects   
2.6.1 Different Income Groups 
In this subsection, we examine whether pipeline hazards had the same effects on the credit access 
across different income groups. All else being equal, the required costs of environmental 
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investigation and remediation for a contaminated property could impose a greater financial burden 
on the lower-income borrowers in the incidents-affected areas. For this reason, we expect lenders 
to have particular concerns about the repayment capability of the lower-income borrowers who 
have weaker financial viability. Thus, we follow the rule provided by the Federal Financial 
Institutions Examination Council to categorize the baseline sample into the low- to middle-income 
group and the upper-income group according to whether the borrower’s annual gross income is 
below or above 120% of the Texas nonmetropolitan median family income. 
We estimate the heterogeneous treatment effects using the two subsamples respectively 
and report the results in Table 9. In Column 1, we find that the low- to middle-income borrowers 
in the pipeline-present areas had a lower origination rate by 2.5% compared to their counterparts 
in the pipeline-free areas at the 5% level. Whenever new incidents occurred, the difference in the 
origination rates was further enlarged by 3.6% at the 1% level. The corresponding pattern appears 
in the denial rates. By contrast, we do not find statistically or economically significant difference 
in the origination rates and denial rates among the upper-income borrowers as a result of the 
presence of pipeline infrastructure or pipeline incidence. The findings are consistent with our 
hypothesis that part of lenders’ perceived risks of pipelines come from their concerns about 
borrowers’ inability to repay the loan especially when cleanup liability is required. On the other 
hand, the results indicate that lenders tended to exclude the lower-income borrowers instead of the 
higher-income borrowers from their portfolio to manage the potential credit risk.  
We also find that the loans from the low- to middle-income borrowers were 1.9% less likely 
to be sold to securitizers due to pipeline hazards (Column 3) while the pipeline-related loans from 
the upper-income borrowers were 1.6% less likely to be packaged for securitization (Column 7) at 
the 10% level. In the securitization market, although lenders may sometimes hold risky loans in 
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their portfolio out of the reputational considerations (Agarwal, Chang and Yavas 2012), more often 
they adversely select the risky loans for securitization to transfer the credit risk (Jimenez and 
Saurina 2006; Dell’Ariccia, Igan and Laeven 2012; Keys, Seru and Vig 2012; Simkovic 2013). 
On the other hand, while the secondary market investors are usually unaware of the localized 
environmental risks, they can make purchase decisions following standards such as the “obligation 
ratios” that relate the applicant’s housing expense and total debt burden to total income (Munnel 
et al. 1996). In our study, we do not have enough information to distinguish the actions chosen by 
lenders. Neither can we identify which party plays a dominant role since securitization involves 
the actions of both sellers and buyers. Nevertheless, our findings suggest slightly lower 
marketability of the loans related to pipeline hazards from the low- to middle-income borrowers 
who are usually deemed as having higher default risk in case of environmental hazards. We infer 
that even though purchasers in the secondary market cannot recognize the environmental risks 
hidden behind they can always screen the loans relying on the observable characteristics of 
borrowers.  
 
2.6.2 Before, During, and After the Subprime Mortgage Crisis 
In this subsection, we examine how lenders’ risk-taking evolved with the stringency of 
securitizers’ guidelines. Specifically, we follow the business cycle reference dates provided by the 
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) to split the baseline sample by the years before 
(2005-2007), during (2008-2009), and after (2010-2011) the late 2000s subprime mortgage 
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crisis.14 We further divide each period’s subsample by borrowers’ income to identify the target 
population for which lenders’ risk management strategy was designed in each period. We estimate 
equation (1) using each specified subsample and report the results in Table 10.  
Before the financial crisis (Panel A), the origination rate in the treatment group was 
insignificantly different from that in the control group among both the low- to middle-income 
borrowers and the upper-income borrowers. Whenever pipeline incidents happened, lenders 
reduced the origination rate in the affected areas by 3.5% for the low- to middle-income borrowers 
at the 5% level. By contrast, lenders did not adjust the loan origination rate for the upper-income 
counterparts in response to the incidents. In the secondary market, however, lenders managed to 
sell the risky loans from the upper-income borrowers to the GSEs, as is shown that in the incidents-
affected areas the originated loans of this group were 2.9% more likely to be sold to the GSEs at 
the 5% level. The different risk management strategies towards the two income groups further 
indicate lenders’ concerns about the default risk of the lower-income borrowers. Moreover, our 
findings demonstrate lenders’ ability to package and sell the incidents-affected loans successfully 
even to the GSEs that are supposed to be most cautious about environmental hazards. Meanwhile, 
as lenders were only able to sell the risky loans from the upper-income borrowers, the findings 
suggest that the purchasers in the secondary market relied on the observable characteristics to 
screen the loans for sale when they only had limited information about the localized risks.  
During the subprime mortgage crisis (Panel B), we do not find statistically significant 
evidence showing lenders’ differential credit decisions towards pipeline hazards among the low- 
                                                 
14 According to NBER, the most recent financial crisis lasted from December 2007 to June 2009. See more 
at http://www.nber.org/cycles.html  
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to middle-income borrowers regardless of whether real incidents happened, though all the 
coefficients show the expected signs and the magnitudes of the estimated effects are even greater 
compared to those in the previous period. However, during this period lenders managed the 
pipeline risks associated with the loans from the upper-income borrowers by decreasing the 
origination rate in the pipeline-present areas by 3.5% at the 5% level.  
After the crisis (Panel C), lenders’ credit decisions started to be significantly different 
across the treatment and the control groups especially among the low- to middle-income 
borrowers. As is shown in Column 1 and Column 2, the origination rate in the treatment group 
was significantly lower by 6.1% compared to that in the control group at the 5% level. 
Correspondingly, the denial rate was significantly higher by 6.7% at the 5% level. The magnitudes 
of both estimates are more than three times bigger than those for the full sample. By contrast, such 
significant group differences in the origination rates and the denial rates did not exist among the 
upper-income borrowers, which reconfirms lenders’ concerns about the lower-income borrowers’ 
repayment ability. We do not identify strong evidence showing lenders’ response to the occurrence 
of new incidents after the crisis. Neither do we find significant evidence showing more sales of 
the risky loans to the securitization market during this period.  
In sum, our results indicate that before the Great Recession lenders did not take 
systematically different actions towards the loans subject to potential pipeline risks. Instead, 
lenders exploited the originate-to-distribute model to manage pipeline hazards only when real 
incidents happened. It was only after the crisis that lenders started to distinguish the origination 
rate in the pipeline-present areas from that in the pipeline-free areas in a systematic way. The 
cyclicality of lenders’ underwriting standards reflects the stringency of mortgage securitizers’ 
guidelines across different periods. In particular, lenders’ reliance on securitization as a risk 
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management strategy coincided with the period of the mid-2000s, during which the deteriorating 
standards in the secondary market significantly reduced lenders’ incentives to carefully screen and 
monitor borrowers’ creditworthiness (Jimenez and Saurina 2006; Rajan, Seru and Vig 2011; 
Dell’Ariccia, Igan and Laeven 2012; Keys, Seru and Vig 2012; Simkovic 2013). The tightened 
securitization after the crisis forced lenders to manage the pipeline-related credit risk by 
discriminating the loans in the pipeline-present areas aggressively, which led to a particular credit 
crunch among the low- to middle-income borrowers during the period.  
 
2.7 Conclusions 
This study provides empirical evidence on mortgage lenders’ perceptions of environmental risks 
using the 2005-2011 home mortgage loans and pipeline incidents in Texas. We find permanent 
difference in lenders’ origination rates and denial rates between the pipeline-present areas and the 
pipeline-free areas. We interpret the difference in terms of lenders’ perceived risks of pipelines, 
which is shown to come from their concerns about both collateral value and borrowers’ repayment 
ability. We also find that lenders further lowered the credit availability to the pipeline-present areas 
whenever new incidents happened, which reflects their increased risk perceptions in response to 
the incidents. We interpret lenders’ changing risk perceptions as evidence of their aversion to the 
uncertainties about the potential environmental liabilities, which would diminish soon after the 
cleanup responsibilities are assigned after the incidents. Finally, we show that lenders’ risk-taking 
reflected the stringency of securitizers’ guidelines across different periods over the financial crisis. 
Before the crisis, the originate-to-distribute business model helped lenders manage pipeline 
hazards passively, while securitizers in the secondary market screened the loans by the observable 
characteristics when they lacked sufficient information about the localized risks. After the 
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tightening of securitization following the crisis, lenders managed pipeline hazards more 
aggressively by avoiding the lower-income borrowers in the pipeline-present areas due to the 
concerns about the default risk. Although our analysis is based on the observable characteristics 
of the loans in the HMDA data, we run a series of robustness checks to test the potential 
consequences of sorting due to both the observable factors and the unobservable factors that are 
correlated with the observable measures of borrowers’ creditworthiness. Our robustness checks 
rule out the possibility of both simultaneous and cumulative sorting of risky borrowers into the 
neighborhoods with densely constructed pipelines and frequent incidents.  
This study contributes to the policy debate on mortgage lenders’ liability dilemma under 
the current environmental laws. While the federal Superfund and a series of state analogs have 
been designed to create a safe harbor from cleanup liabilities for lenders, a qualified exemption is 
still subject to when and how lenders interact with the contaminated properties as well as judicial 
interpretation on a case-by-case basis. Moreover, as the state statutes may differ from the federal 
scheme, lenders also have to be cautious about the state-specific qualifications for the liability 
exemption to apply within the state’s jurisdiction (Ahrens and Langer 2008; Sigel and Bandza 
2014). As we show in this study, a significant number of lenders are still reluctant to make loans 
to the neighborhoods subject to potential environmental risks. From a policy perspective, lenders’ 
fear of environmental liabilities could lead to a credit crunch to otherwise creditworthy borrowers. 
More importantly, it could impede the real estate investment and slow down the redevelopment of 
those historically contaminated sites. This study calls for policy makers’ involvement in seeking 
ways to reduce the deterrent effects of environmental contamination and the associated cleanup 
liabilities.  
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This study also sheds new light on mortgage lenders’ risk management of environmental 
hazards. The empirical evidence suggests that lenders once managed the pipeline-related credit 
risk by denying the risky loans from the low- to middle-income borrowers and relying on the 
securitization market to sell the risky loans from the upper-income borrowers. Although we only 
examine the discrete lending decisions, lenders could always capitalize pipeline hazards into 
mortgage prices by requiring borrowers to pay the risk premium as a condition of closing the loan. 
Moreover, lenders may consider using tailored environmental insurance products to insure against 
the unknown environmental hazards (Bressler 2002; Davis and Levy 2012). Lenders may require 
borrowers to purchase the environmental insurance policies that mainly cover owners for their 
cleanup expenses above a certain amount for the unforeseen environmental conditions. 
Alternatively, lenders themselves may use the secured creditor environmental insurance policies, 
which could pay off the outstanding balance in the event of a default or cover the cleanup costs 
after foreclosing on the loan.  
Finally, our study informs the public discourse about pipeline hazards and identifies the 
population at risk. We show that pipeline hazards have resulted in a direct loss of mortgage credit 
access to the low- to middle-income borrowers. Hence, environmental externalities of pipelines 
could become a potential barrier for those credit constrained families to obtain homeownership. 
Therefore, enhancing pipeline safety has significant policy implications for lower-income 
borrowers to improve their mortgage credit availability as well as homeownership opportunity, 
which is a primary vehicle for these households to accumulate wealth and access economic 
opportunity. 
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2.8 Tables and Figures 
Table 2.1 Summary Statistics by the Treatment and the Control Groups, 2005-2011 
 
Pipeline-present  
Census tracts 
Pipeline-free 
Census tracts 
 Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Dependent Variables     
Originated 0.723 0.448 0.736 0.441 
Denied 0.204 0.403 0.186 0.389 
Sold 0.434 0.496 0.495 0.500 
Sold to the GSEs 0.223 0.417 0.267 0.442 
     
Pipeline Incidents     
Number of pipeline incidents 0.059 0.235 0.001* 0.022 
Property damage  101,036 2,685,651.50 0.119* 5.302 
     
Borrowers’ Characteristics     
Loan amount (in $10,000’s) 11.707 10.142 10.525 8.867 
Annual gross income (in $10,000’s) 8.003 10.911 6.993 7.371 
Loan-to-income ratio 1.746 1.830 1.818 3.691 
Co-applicants 0.490 0.500 0.461 0.499 
Latino 0.172 0.377 0.254 0.435 
Male 0.770 0.421 0.744 0.436 
Asian 0.008 0.092 0.010 0.098 
Black 0.029 0.168 0.025 0.156 
White 0.948 0.221 0.950 0.217 
     
Census Tracts’ Characteristics     
Population density (thousand per 𝑘𝑚2) 1.429 2.691 4.527 4.078 
Minority population% 0.294 0.213 0.385 0.253 
Median family income (in $10,000’s) 4.771 1.020 4.448 1.188 
Number of owner-occupied units (in 1000) 1.465 0.671 1.144 0.416 
Number of 1- to 4- family units (in 1000) 2.189 0.925 1.754 0.575 
Distance to the nearest refineries (1000 km) 0.110 0.061 0.127 0.068 
Number of Observations  55,344  7,988 
Note: The treatment group includes all the nonmetro Census tracts in Texas where pipelines exist, 
and the control group includes the remaining nonmetro Census tracts free of any pipeline 
infrastructure. The sample includes the HMDA loan applications for the conventional, 1- to 4-family, 
owner-occupied, and first-lien home purchase loans in Texas from 2005-2011.  
*One Census tract in Stephens County does not have any pipeline infrastructure but experienced an 
oil spill due to tank overfill in 2010.  
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Table 2.2 The Effects of Pipeline Incidents 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Originated Denied Sold Sold  
to the GSEs 
 Coeff. 𝑡-Stat. Coeff. 𝑡-Stat. Coeff. 𝑡-Stat. Coeff. 𝑡-Stat. 
𝑝𝑖𝑝𝑒𝑗 -0.019*** -2.6 0.013** 2.1 -0.018** -2.2 -0.005 -0.9 
𝑝𝑖𝑝𝑒𝑗 ∗ 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑗𝑡 -0.018** -2.0 0.017** 2.4 0.009 1.1 0.012 1.5 
log(loan amount) 0.031*** 5.2 -0.032*** -5.3 0.148*** 10.5 0.029*** 4.5 
log(annual gross income) 0.049*** 8.1 -0.059*** -9.5 -0.119*** -8.6 -0.037*** -5.6 
Loan-to-income ratio -0.007** -2.4 0.007** 2.4 -0.041*** -4.6 -0.010*** -2.8 
Co-applicants 0.001 0.2 0.006 1.6 0.003 0.7 0.011*** 3.0 
Latino -0.081*** -13.9 0.077*** 13.8 -0.065*** -8.2 -0.033*** -6.8 
Male 0.019*** 4.3 -0.017*** -4.1 0.002 0.4 0.003 0.6 
Asian -0.002 -0.1 -0.004 -0.2 0.015 0.6 0.031 1.3 
Black -0.145*** -6.8 0.145*** 7.3 -0.015 -0.7 -0.061*** -3.3 
White 0.049*** 3.1 -0.052*** -3.4 0.006 0.3 -0.007 -0.5 
Population density 0.005*** 7.4 -0.005*** -6.5 0.002*** 2.9 0.001 1.5 
Minority population % 0.029 1.3 -0.030 -1.5 0.002 0.1 0.022 1.2 
log(median family income) 0.112*** 7.9 -0.105*** -7.8 0.042** 2.6 0.044*** 2.8 
Number of owner-occupied units 0.015 1.0 -0.009 -0.6 0.025* 1.9 0.007 0.6 
Number of 1- to 4- family units -0.006 -0.6 0.003 0.3 -0.011 -1.2 -0.004 -0.4 
Distance to refineries 0.032 0.2 0.141 0.8 -0.175 -0.9 -0.243 -1.4 
Constant 0.347*** 8.1 0.493*** 12.7 0.696*** 14.8 0.738*** 17.1 
Year Fixed Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
County Fixed Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Lender Fixed Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations 62,244  62,244  45,104  45,104  
R-squared 0.166  0.188  0.536  0.583  
Notes: Columns 1 and 2 use the 2005-2011 full sample of loan applications, whereas Columns 3 and 4 use the 2005-
2011 sample of the originated loans. The dependent variables are listed as the column titles. The variable 𝑝𝑖𝑝𝑒𝑗 is coded 
as 1 if pipelines are present in Census tract 𝑗, and 0 otherwise. The estimates of 𝑝𝑖𝑝𝑒𝑗 measure the permanent effects of 
pipeline infrastructure. The variable 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑗𝑡 is coded as 1 if a pipeline incident occurred to Census tract 𝑗 in year 𝑡, and 
0 otherwise. The estimates of 𝑝𝑖𝑝𝑒𝑗 ∗ 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑗𝑡 measure the effects of pipeline incidents. The estimates of the coefficients 
are presented in the table, with t-statistics reported using clustered standard errors by Census tract. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table 2.3 The Effects Before and After a Pipeline Incident 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Originated Denied Sold Sold  
to the GSEs 
 Coeff. 𝑡-Stat. Coeff. 𝑡-Stat. Coeff. 𝑡-Stat. Coeff. 𝑡-Stat. 
𝑝𝑖𝑝𝑒𝑗 -0.022*** -2.6 0.014* 1.9 -0.021** -2.4 -0.010 -1.6 
𝑝𝑖𝑝𝑒𝑗*𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑗,𝑡+1 -0.008 -0.9 0.008 1.0 -0.001 -0.1 -0.004 -0.4 
𝑝𝑖𝑝𝑒𝑗 ∗ 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑗,𝑡 -0.018* -1.7 0.017* 1.9 0.004 0.5 0.003 0.3 
𝑝𝑖𝑝𝑒𝑗*𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑗,𝑡−1 -0.009 -0.8 0.007 0.7 -0.001 -0.1 0.001 0.1 
Observations 46,817  46,817  33,604  33,604  
R-squared 0.178  0.202  0.544  0.613  
Notes: Columns 1 and 2 use the 2006-2010 full sample of loan applications, whereas Columns 3 and 4 
use the 2006-2010 sample of the originated loans. The dependent variables are listed as the column 
titles. The estimates of 𝑝𝑖𝑝𝑒𝑗 measure the permanent effects of pipeline infrastructure. The estimates 
of 𝑝𝑖𝑝𝑒𝑗 ∗ 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑗𝑡 measure the contemporaneous effects of pipeline incidents, the estimates of 𝑝𝑖𝑝𝑒𝑗 ∗
𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑗,𝑡+1 measure the counterfactual effects before pipeline incidents, and the estimates of 𝑝𝑖𝑝𝑒𝑗 ∗
𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑗,𝑡−1 measure the lagged effects of pipeline incidents. We use the same control variables and fixed 
effects as in the baseline case (Table 2.2). The estimates of the coefficients are presented in the table, 
with t-statistics reported using clustered standard errors by Census tract. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1.  
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Table 2.4 Early versus Late Incidents 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Originated Denied Sold Sold  
to the GSEs 
 Coeff. 𝑡-Stat. Coeff. 𝑡-Stat. Coeff. 𝑡-Stat. Coeff. 𝑡-Stat. 
Panel A: Pipeline Incidents in the First Quarter of the Year 
𝑝𝑖𝑝𝑒𝑗 -0.015* -1.9 0.007 1.1 -0.014 -1.6 -0.001 -0.2 
𝑝𝑖𝑝𝑒𝑗 ∗ 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑗𝑡 -0.032** -2.0 0.029** 2.1 0.020 1.5 0.042*** 2.7 
Observations 50,979  50,979  37,173  37,173  
R-squared 0.170  0.194  0.528  0.572  
 
Panel B: Pipeline Incidents in the Whole Year 
𝑝𝑖𝑝𝑒𝑗 -0.013* -1.7 0.006 0.8 -0.014* -1.7 -0.002 -0.3 
𝑝𝑖𝑝𝑒𝑗 ∗ 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑗𝑡 -0.019** -2.0 0.022*** 2.8 0.009 1.0 0.015* 1.7 
Observations 52,791  52,791  38,467  38,467  
R-squared 0.169  0.194  0.527  0.571  
Notes: The analysis in this table pertains to the 2005-2009 loan applications (Columns 1 and 2) and the 
sample of the originated loans over this period (Columns 3 and 4). Panel A includes a sample of the 
Census tracts that experienced incidents as early as in the first quarter of the year. Panel B includes a 
sample in which incidents occurred anytime of the year. The dependent variables are listed as the 
column titles. The estimates of 𝑝𝑖𝑝𝑒𝑗 measure the permanent effects of pipeline infrastructure. The 
estimates of 𝑝𝑖𝑝𝑒𝑗 ∗ 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑗𝑡  measure the effects of pipeline incidents. We use the same control 
variables and fixed effects as in the baseline case (Table 2.2). The estimates of the coefficients are 
presented in the table, with t-statistics reported using clustered standard errors by Census tract. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table 2.5 Borrowers’ Characteristics 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Loan Amount  
(in $10,000’s) 
Annual Gross 
Income 
(in $10,000’s) 
Loan-to- 
income Ratio 
Co-applicant Latino Male White 
 Coeff. 𝑡-Stat. Coeff. 𝑡-Stat. Coeff. 𝑡-Stat. Coeff. 𝑡-Stat. Coeff. 𝑡-Stat. Coeff. 𝑡-Stat. Coeff. 𝑡-Stat. 
𝑝𝑖𝑝𝑒𝑗 1.015*** 2.8 0.934*** 3.4 -0.042 -1.1 0.014 1.4 0.007 0.6 0.005 0.7 -0.003 -0.4 
𝑝𝑖𝑝𝑒𝑗 ∗ 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑗𝑡 0.142 0.5 0.283 1.2 -0.021 -0.8 0.012 1.1 -0.012 -1.3 0.011 1.4 0.008 1.6 
Observations 63,332  62,244  62,244  63,332  63,332  63,332  63,332  
R-squared 0.147  0.032  0.020  0.068  0.256  0.012  0.034  
Notes: The table reports the estimation results using the 2005-2011 full sample of loan applications. The dependent variables are listed as the column titles. 
The estimates of 𝑝𝑖𝑝𝑒𝑗 measure the permanent effects of pipeline infrastructure. The estimates of 𝑝𝑖𝑝𝑒𝑗 ∗ 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑗𝑡 measure the effects of pipeline incidents. 
We use the same control variables and fixed effects as in the baseline case (Table 2.2). The estimates of the coefficients are presented in the table, with t-
statistics reported using clustered standard errors by Census tract. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 2.6 Lenders’ Denial Reasons 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Debt-to- 
income 
Ratio 
Employment 
History 
Credit 
History 
Insufficient 
Collateral 
Insufficient 
Cash 
Unverifiable  
information 
Credit  
Application  
Incomplete 
Mortgage 
Insurance 
Denied 
 Coeff. 𝑡-Stat. Coeff. 𝑡-Stat. Coeff. 𝑡-Stat. Coeff. 𝑡-Stat. Coeff. 𝑡-Stat. Coeff. 𝑡-Stat. Coeff. 𝑡-Stat. Coeff. 𝑡-Stat. 
𝑝𝑖𝑝𝑒𝑗 -0.011 -0.7 -0.010 -1.1 -0.018 -1.0 0.032** 2.1 -0.003 -0.3 0.007 0.7 0.010 0.9 0.004 1.3 
𝑝𝑖𝑝𝑒𝑗 ∗ 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑗𝑡 -0.010 -0.6 0.021* 1.9 -0.001 -0.1 0.009 0.4 -0.004 -0.3 -0.018 -1.6 0.006 0.5 -0.002 -0.5 
Observations 9,894  9,894  9,894  9,894  9,894  9,894  9,894  9,894  
R-squared 0.194  0.084  0.338  0.165  0.119  0.175  0.312  0.142  
Notes: The table reports the estimation results using the 2005-2011 sample of the denied loans with denial reasons available. The dependent variables 
are listed as the column titles. The estimates of 𝑝𝑖𝑝𝑒𝑗 measure the permanent effects of pipeline infrastructure. The estimates of 𝑝𝑖𝑝𝑒𝑗 ∗ 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑗𝑡 
measure the effects of pipeline incidents. We use the same control variables and fixed effects as in the baseline case (Table 2.2). The estimates of the 
coefficients are presented in the table, with t-statistics reported using clustered standard errors by Census tract. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 2.7 Cumulative Sorting Effects I: Census Tracts of Different Intensity of Pipelines, 2005-2011 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Pipeline-free 
Census tracts 
The first 
quartile group  
The fourth  
quartile group 
Difference between  
(1) and (2) 
(𝑝-value) 
Difference between  
(2) and (3) 
(𝑝-value) 
Loan amount (in $10,000’s) 10.525 10.408 11.944 0.117 -1.536  
(8.867) (9.577) (9.528) (0.360) (0.000) 
Annual gross income (in $10,000’s) 6.993 7.186 8.348 -0.193 -1.162  
(7.371) (8.100) (10.909) (0.075) (0.000) 
Loan-to-income ratio 1.818 1.718 1.714 0.100 0.003 
 
(3.691) (1.145) (2.912) (0.019) (0.908) 
Co-applicants 0.461 0.451 0.515 0.011 -0.064  
(0.499) (0.498) (0.500) (0.126) (0.000) 
Latino 0.254 0.260 0.162 -0.006 0.098  
(0.435) (0.439) (0.368) (0.330) (0.000) 
Male 0.744 0.749 0.803 -0.004 -0.054  
(0.436) (0.434) (0.398) (0.476) (0.000) 
Asian 0.010 0.013 0.005 -0.003 0.007  
(0.098) (0.111) (0.073) (0.057) (0.000) 
Black 0.025 0.031 0.021 -0.006 0.011  
(0.156) (0.174) (0.142) (0.006) (0.000) 
White 0.950 0.938 0.962 0.013 -0.024  
(0.217) (0.242) (0.192) (0.000) (0.000) 
Population density 4.527 4.503 0.105 0.024 4.399  
(4.078) (3.800) (0.100) (0.667) (0.000)  
Minority population % 0.385 0.375 0.284 0.010 0.091  
(0.253) (0.239) (0.199) (0.003) (0.000) 
Median family income (in $10,000’s) 4.448 4.650 4.738 -0.202 -0.088 
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Table 2.7 (cont.)  
 
(1.188) (1.237) (0.775) (0.000) (0.000) 
Number of owner-occupied units 1.144 1.200 1.538 -0.056 -0.338  
(0.416) (0.438) (0.687) (0.000) (0.000)  
Number of 1- to 4- family units 1.754 1.872 2.261 -0.118 -0.388 
 (0.575) (0.614) (0.909) (0.000) (0.000)  
Distance to refineries 0.127 0.119 0.095 0.008 0.024 
 (0.068) (0.061) (0.057) (0.000) (0.000) 
N 7,988 13,889 13,811     
Notes:  
1. The table reports, for the 2005-2011 full sample, the mean characteristics of borrowers and neighborhoods for the pipeline-free Census tracts 
(Column 1), the Census tracts falling into the first quartile group (Column 2) and the fourth quartile group (Column 3) of the distribution of the 
pipelines’ length in each Census tract. In parenthesis of each cell from Column 1 to Column 3 is the standard deviation of the characteristics of 
that cell.  
2. The table also reports the difference of the characteristics between Column 1 and Column 2 (in Column 4) and the difference between Column 
2 and Column 3 (in Column 5). In parenthesis of each cell from Column 4 and Column 5 is the 𝑝-value for an unpaired two-sample mean-
comparison 𝑡-test testing the null hypothesis that the characteristics are equal across the two corresponding groups.  
 
51 
 
Table 2.8 Cumulative Sorting Effects II: Census Tracts of Different Frequencies of Pipeline Incidents, 2011 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Incidents-free  
Census tracts 
Census tracts  
with one  
incident 
Census tracts  
with two  
incidents 
Census tracts  
with three or  
more incidents 
Difference  
between  
(1) and (2) 
(𝑝-value) 
Difference 
between  
(2) and (4) 
(𝑝-value) 
Loan amount (in $10,000’s) 11.561 14.099 12.437 12.930 -2.538 1.169  
(9.645) (12.685) (9.056) (10.325) (0.000) (0.191) 
Annual gross income (in $10,000’s) 8.372 9.545 8.841 10.676 -1.173 -1.131  
(8.296) (9.286) (6.604) (17.281) (0.003) (0.388) 
Loan-to-income ratio 1.776 1.727 1.590 1.694 0.049 0.033 
 
(5.674) (1.335) (1.003) (1.156) (0.669) (0.737) 
Co-applicants 0.578 0.620 0.628 0.667 -0.042 -0.047  
(0.494) (0.486) (0.485) (0.473) (0.043) (0.231) 
Latino 0.197 0.207 0.177 0.219 -0.010 -0.012  
(0.398) (0.405) (0.383) (0.414) (0.563) (0.720) 
Male 0.776 0.837 0.787 0.849 -0.061 -0.012  
(0.417) (0.370) (0.411) (0.359) (0.000) (0.689) 
Asian 0.007 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.006  
(0.086) (0.077) (0.000) (0.000) (0.680) (0.045) 
Black 0.026 0.017 0.012 0.021 0.010 -0.004  
(0.161) (0.128) (0.110) (0.143) (0.085) (0.712) 
White 0.957 0.973 0.988 0.979 -0.015 -0.006  
(0.202) (0.163) (0.110) (0.143) (0.034) (0.602) 
Population density 1.793 0.567 0.092 0.150 1.226 0.416  
(2.965) (1.376) (0.123) (0.197) (0.000) (0.000) 
Minority population % 0.310 0.275 0.225 0.345 0.035 -0.069  
(0.220) (0.193) (0.142) (0.166) (0.000) (0.000) 
Median family income (in $10,000’s) 5.180 5.401 5.161 5.258 -0.221 0.143 
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Table 2.8 (cont.) 
 
(1.143) (0.843) (0.590) (0.986) (0.000) (0.069) 
Number of owner-occupied units 1.355 1.528 1.474 1.406 -0.173 0.122  
(0.600) (0.646) (0.581) (0.756) (0.000) (0.042) 
Number of 1- to 4- family units 2.055 2.211 2.210 2.036 -0.156 0.175 
 (0.851) (0.795) (0.825) (1.089) (0.000) (0.039) 
Distance to refineries 0.114 0.099 0.095 0.098 0.015 0.001 
 (0.061) (0.058) (0.065) (0.044) (0.000) (0.816) 
N 3,097 663 164 192   
Notes:  
1. The table reports, for the 2011 sample, the mean characteristics of borrowers and neighborhoods for the Census tracts without experiencing 
any incident (Column 1), experiencing one incident (Column 2), two incidents (Column 3), and three or more incidents (Column 4) from 2005 
to 2011. In parenthesis of each cell from Column 1 to Column 4 is the standard deviation of the characteristics of that cell.  
2. The table also reports the difference of the characteristics between Column 1 and Column 2 (in Column 5) and the difference between Column 
2 and Column 4 (in Column 6). In parenthesis of each cell from Column 5 and Column 6 is the 𝑝-value for an unpaired two-sample mean-
comparison 𝑡-test testing the null hypothesis that the characteristics are equal across the two corresponding groups. 
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Table 2.9 Heterogeneous Treatment Effects I: Different Income Groups 
 Low- to Middle-income Borrowers Upper-income Borrowers 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Originated Denied Sold Sold  
to the GSEs 
Originated Denied Sold Sold  
to the GSEs 
 Coeff. 𝑡-
Stat. 
Coeff. 𝑡-
Stat. 
Coeff. 𝑡-
Stat. 
Coeff. 𝑡-
Stat. 
Coeff. 𝑡-
Stat. 
Coeff. 𝑡-
Stat. 
Coeff. 𝑡-
Stat. 
Coeff. 𝑡-
Stat. 
𝑝𝑖𝑝𝑒𝑗 -0.025** -2.2 0.018** 2.1 -0.019* -1.8 -0.009 -1.1 -0.008 -0.8 0.003 0.4 -0.016* -1.8 -0.003 -0.4 
𝑝𝑖𝑝𝑒𝑗 ∗ 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑗𝑡 -0.036*** -2.8 0.025** 2.1 0.004 0.3 0.008 0.6 -0.008 -0.8 0.015 1.6 0.008 0.8 0.010 1.0 
Observations 26,023  26,023  17,074  17,074  36,221  36,221  28,030  28,030  
R-squared 0.187  0.207  0.598  0.596  0.157  0.177  0.518  0.586  
Notes: Columns 1-4 use the 2005-2011 low- to middle-income borrowers’ loan applications, whereas Columns 5-8 use the 2005-2011 upper-income 
borrowers’ loan applications. Columns 3, 4, 7, and 8 use the sample of the originated loans in the corresponding income group. The dependent variables 
are listed as the column titles. The estimates of 𝑝𝑖𝑝𝑒𝑗 measure the permanent effects of pipeline infrastructure. The estimates of 𝑝𝑖𝑝𝑒𝑗 ∗ 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑗𝑡 measure 
the effects of pipeline incidents. We use the same control variables and fixed effects as in the baseline case (Table 2). The estimates of the coefficients are 
presented in the table, with t-statistics reported using clustered standard errors by Census tract. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 2.10 Heterogeneous Treatment Effects II: Before, During, and After the Subprime Mortgage Crisis by Income Group 
 Low- to Middle-income Borrowers Upper-income Borrowers 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Originated Denied Sold Sold 
to the GSEs 
Originated Denied Sold Sold 
to the GSEs 
 Coeff. 𝑡-Stat. Coeff. 𝑡-Stat. Coeff. 𝑡-Stat. Coeff. 𝑡-Stat. Coeff. 𝑡-Stat. Coeff. 𝑡-Stat. Coeff. 𝑡-Stat. Coeff. 𝑡-Stat. 
Panel A: Before the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 2005 - 2007 
𝑝𝑖𝑝𝑒𝑗 -0.017 -1.4 0.009 0.9 -0.018 -1.6 -0.018 -1.6 0.008 0.7 -0.010 -0.9 -0.011 -0.9 0.002 0.2 
𝑝𝑖𝑝𝑒𝑗 ∗ 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑗𝑡 -0.035** -2.4 0.021 1.6 -0.003 -0.2 0.005 0.3 0.004 0.2 0.018 1.3 0.018 1.3 0.029** 2.2 
Observations 16,631  16,631  11,106  11,106  22,001  22,001  16,986  16,986  
R-squared 0.184  0.212  0.574  0.567  0.175  0.202  0.479  0.547  
Panel B: During the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 2008-2009 
𝑝𝑖𝑝𝑒𝑗 -0.020 -0.9 0.003 0.1 -0.016 -0.7 0.012 0.8 -0.035** -2.1 0.021 1.4 -0.002 -0.1 0.011 0.8 
𝑝𝑖𝑝𝑒𝑗 ∗ 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑗𝑡 -0.040 -1.0 0.033 0.9 0.016 0.5 0.014 0.6 -0.025 -1.1 0.018 0.9 0.012 0.6 0.022 1.4 
Observations 5,481  5,481  3,610  3,610  8,678  8,678  6,765  6,765  
R-squared 0.293  0.297  0.696  0.766  0.201  0.228  0.605  0.746  
Panel C: After the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 2010-2011 
𝑝𝑖𝑝𝑒𝑗 -0.061** -2.0 0.067** 2.5 -0.030 -1.0 -0.003 -0.1 -0.024 -0.9 0.034 1.5 -0.022 -0.8 -0.011 -0.7 
𝑝𝑖𝑝𝑒𝑗 ∗ 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑗𝑡 -0.060 -1.6 0.040 1.2 0.079* 1.9 0.010 0.4 -0.003 -0.1 -0.001 -0.0 0.000 0.0 -0.014 -0.8 
Observations 3,911  3,911  2,358  2,358  5,542  5,542  4,279  4,279  
R-squared 0.280  0.287  0.650  0.745  0.220  0.226  0.597  0.700  
Notes: Panel A, B, and C report the estimation results using the 2005-2007, 2008-2009, and 2010-2011 sample, respectively. Columns 1-4 use the low- to middle-income 
borrowers’ loan applications, whereas Columns 5-8 use the upper-income borrowers’ loan applications. Columns 3, 4, 7, and 8 use the sample of the originated loans in 
the corresponding income group. The dependent variables are listed as the column titles. The estimates of the coefficients are presented in the table, with t-statistics 
reported using clustered standard errors by Census tract. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Figure 2.1 Texas Pipeline Network 
 
Source: Generated by the authors using data from the U.S. Energy Information Administration. 
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Figure 2.2 Quartile Distribution of Total Property Damage of Pipeline Incidents in Texas, 
2005-2011 
 
Source: Generated by the authors using data from the U.S. Department of Transportation Pipeline and 
Hazardous Materials Safety Administration. We convert the total property damage into 2011 U.S. dollars.  
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Figure 2.3 Pipeline Incidents in the Nonmetro Texas from 2005 to 2011 
 
Source: Generated by the authors based on the data from the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety 
Administration (PHMSA). According to the PHMSA, significant incidents refer to those associated with 
fatality, injury, or total property damage over $50,000. We convert the total property damage into 2011 
U.S. dollars.  
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CHAPTER 3 
DO UNCONVENTIONAL OIL AND GAS WELLS GENERATE MORE 
WASTEWATER? A LIFESPAN PERSPECTIVE 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Wastewater disposal has always been a critical issue in the oil and gas industry due to the potential 
risks of causing environmental contamination. The chemical constituents identified in oil and gas 
wastewater could lead to mortality of aquatic species and severe damage to ground vegetation and 
human health when present in high concentrations (Veil et al., 2004). Unconventional oil and gas 
production combines fracking and horizontal drilling to extract shale resources, which involves 
more complex chemicals and produces more hazardous wastewater compared with conventional 
production methods (Orem et al., 2017). From 2003 to 2016, the annual total wastewater produced 
by horizontal wells in shale formations (“UOG wells”) increased by 13.6 times while the volume 
of vertical wells (“COG wells”) remained constant over the period (Top left panel of Figure 1). As 
the rapid growth of UOG wastewater production has outpaced the handling and disposal capacity 
in many regions (Lutz et al., 2013), the untreated and inadequately treated wastewater not only 
contaminates soil, surface water, and shallow groundwater near the drilling locations but also 
threatens the drinking water quality downstream of the wastewater disposal sites (Wilson and Van 
Briesen, 2013; States et al, 2013; Vengosh et al., 2014). In the long term, the large volume of 
wastewater produced by UOG wells may further lead to radium accumulation and persist as 
environmental and health hazards by gradually releasing toxic elements and radiation in the 
impacted areas (Warner et al., 2013a; Vengosh et al., 2014).  
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Although oil and gas wastewater has long been controversial because of its sheer volume 
and the associated environmental risks, comprehensive and accurate quantification of the impacts 
of unconventional techniques on wastewater production has been absent to date. To understand 
the wastewater production pattern of UOG wells, it is first worth noting that the increased total 
volume coincided with a rising number of UOG wells nationwide, which has increased from 4,882 
in 2003 to 73,410 in 2016 (Top right panel of Figure 1). Moreover, the average per-well UOG 
wastewater has also increased rapidly since the late 2000s and exceeded that of COG wells by 
2014 (Bottom left panel of Figure 1). Although a naïve comparison between the two types of wells 
suggests that on average a UOG well produces more wastewater than a COG one, the conclusion 
could be misleading since it does not take into account well-level heterogeneities in resource type, 
energy production, and production age. In particular, engineering evidence shows that UOG 
wastewater usually drops rapidly in volume after the initial production stage and then remains at a 
considerably lower daily flow rate throughout the rest of life (Veil, 2015; Kondash, Albright, and 
Vengosh, 2017). Thus, a well’s production age is an essential factor to understand its wastewater 
production pattern. As is illustrated in the bottom right panel of Figure 1, while new wells that just 
started energy production in each year only accounted for about 5% among COG wells, their 
share among UOG wells was much higher and volatile, ranging from the peak of 31% in 2007 
to 4% in 2016. Moreover, as the fracking technology has been improving continuously over time, 
simply pooling wells of different cohorts may confound the distinct production pattern of each 
cohort. Above all, to discern the precise impact of fracking on wastewater production requires an 
econometric analysis to account for the lifespan pattern, the cohort pattern, and the heterogeneity 
in other characteristics of a well.  
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In this study, we examine how fracking and horizontal drilling in UOG production has 
affected the pattern of wastewater production both contemporaneously and cumulatively over the 
lifespan of a well. We conduct an empirical analysis using proprietary panel data for 49,050 
onshore oil and gas wells in the U.S. from 2008 through 2016. One challenge in identifying the 
use of the fracking technique by UOG wells is the lack of well-level data on the type of technology 
used for a national sample of wells. To circumvent this problem, we make use of each well’s drill 
direction (horizontal or vertical) and geographic location (shale or non-shale) as an indicator of 
the use of fracking technology. Exploiting the fact that fracking is widely combined with horizontal 
drilling to extract energy from shale formations, we infer that horizontal wells in shale formations 
are UOG wells. We then define COG wells as all vertical wells regardless of location, which could 
be on either shale or non-shale formations.  
Our study provides the first econometric analysis of the effects of unconventional 
stimulation and drilling techniques on wastewater production, using a comprehensive sample of 
wells with detailed geographic information and lifespan observations. We estimate the cohort- and 
age-varying differences in wastewater quantity and efficiency between UOG and COG wells for 
each cohort year from 2008 to 2016, controlling for wells’ resource type, the dominant 
hydrocarbon type, energy production, county-level permanent disparities, state-specific time 
trends and business model of different operators. We find that UOG wells starting production 
before 2010 produced a statistically similar or a significantly lower amount of wastewater 
contemporaneously compared to COG wells throughout their entire lifespan. We further show that 
the difference between the two types of wells had reversed since 2010 when UOG wells, on 
average, started to produce more wastewater than COG wells in the first six months of their 
lifespan. The cohort-specific analysis shows that the contemporaneous gap in the initial months 
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was larger in more recent cohorts, which indicates that the prevalence of the fracking technology 
over time has led wastewater production by UOG wells to be increasingly front-loaded. Regardless 
of cohort years, the estimated difference in contemporaneous wastewater production between the 
two types of wells always decreased with age in magnitude and turned statistically insignificant 
eventually, which indicates that both types of wells produced a statistically similar amount of 
wastewater as wells aged.  
We also demonstrate similar lifespan and cohort patterns in cumulative wastewater volume 
of the two types of wells. The estimation results show that the cumulative wastewater produced by 
UOG wells that started production after 2010 was significantly higher than that of COG wells 
during their initial stage of production. However, the estimated difference tended to diminish with 
age and become significantly negative eventually. Furthermore, the “breakeven” point at which 
the cumulative wastewater production of UOG wells equaled that of COG wells occurred at an 
older age in more recent cohorts. For example, the positive difference between UOG and COG 
wells had turned negative since the 42nd month in the 2010 cohort in contrast to the 47th month in 
the 2011 cohort. For younger cohorts, the “breakeven” points were not yet achieved within the 
timeframe of our sample. These results indicate that the cumulative wastewater production of UOG 
wells may ultimately be lower than that for COG wells despite the growingly intensive wastewater 
production in the initial years of a well’s lifespan.  
Finally, the estimation results show that the wastewater-to-energy ratio of UOG wells was 
always significantly lower than that of COG wells. Although the difference was enlarged in 
magnitude in younger cohorts, it did not vary with a well’s age as production continued, which 
suggests that the higher amount of wastewater in the initial production stage was accompanied by 
a proportionally larger volume of energy production. Our results also indicate that, relative to COG 
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wells, UOG wells were growing more efficient over time measured by a lower wastewater-to-
energy ratio in more recent cohorts. Our findings challenge the myths that fracking increases the 
overall oil and gas wastewater production and shows that the impact of fracking on wastewater 
production is nuanced. The real concern lies in the highly intensive production in the initial few 
years after a well begins production but not in the lifespan cumulative volume or the production 
efficiency. 
This study extends the literature on the effects of fracking on water resources. Existing 
studies focus on the impacts of fracking on the quality of both surface water and groundwater. A 
rich body of engineering studies examine the chemical composition of fracking wastewater 
directly (Osborn et al. 2011; Warner et al. 2013a, 2013b, 2014; Darrah et al. 2014; Harkness et al., 
2015), while ecologists and environmental economists also discuss the fracking-related water 
quality issue (Entrekin et al., 2011; Papoulias and Velasco 2013; Hitaj et al., 2014; Muehlenbachs 
and Olmstead, 2014). Some econometric studies use hedonic price models to show homebuyers’ 
perceived risks of water contamination through a lower marginal willingness to pay to live near 
the drilling wells (Gopalakrishnan and Klaiber, 2013; Muehlenbachs et al., 2015).  
Several studies have also estimated the effects of fracking on water quantity, which 
includes both freshwater as the input and wastewater as the byproduct of the fracking process. The 
focus of these studies has been centered on the water-use efficiency of fracking relative to other 
extraction methods (Goodwin et al., 2014; Kondash and Vengosh, 2015), the potential water stress 
issue in local areas (Freyman, 2014; Gallegos et al., 2015; Horner et al., 2016), and the challenges 
posed to regional wastewater disposal and treatment capacity (Lutz et al., 2013; Nicot et al., 2014). 
However, existing studies are limited to regional case studies of isolated shale basins. By contrast, 
our study uses a comprehensive national sample of wells and accounts for heterogeneities in well 
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configuration and local geology. Our study also differs from previous research by considering the 
age-varying production pattern over a well’s lifespan and the distinct production patterns across 
different cohorts.  
 
3.2 Background 
In UOG production, fracking serves as a recovery stimulation process to enhance the productivity 
of oil and gas wells. Before the innovation of horizontal drilling, fracking used to be applied to 
conventional geological formations and mature fields of low productivity (Morton, 2013; Wang 
and Krupnick, 2013). Horizontal drilling differs from vertical drilling by extending the range of 
fracking sideways along a rock formation rather than contacting it vertically, which significantly 
increases the area of reservoirs where hydrocarbons can be extracted and thus gives operators more 
economic incentives to use the fracking technology (Morton, 2013).1 In 2002, a merger between 
Mitchell Energy and Devon Energy expedited the application of horizontal drilling, which led to 
a rapid increase in the combined use of the new drilling technique and fracking (Morton, 2013; 
Wang and Krupnick, 2013). The combination of the two technologies makes it technically and 
economically feasible to extract fossil fuels trapped in shale formations whose permeability is 
extremely low (Lutz et al., 2013). 
The widespread use of fracking significantly affects the life cycle of wastewater production 
in the oil and gas industry. In UOG production, fracking occurs within a few days or weeks right 
after a well’s drilling and completion phase during which up to six million gallons of water is 
                                                 
1 Horizontal drilling discussed in this study also includes directional drilling. Thus, horizontal wells defined 
in this study refers to wells that are drilled either horizontally or at an angle relative to vertical wells.  
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injected into each well (Finkel, 2015; U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 2016). The 
upfront water requirement for fracking leads to an extremely high rate of initial flowback, with up 
to 70 percent of the fluid discharging back out of the well shortly after the process (EPA, 2015). 
After the first few weeks, the volume of wastewater returning to the surface diminishes to a 
considerably lower level. Wastewater containing both residual fracking fluids and natural 
formation water is generated continuously but at a much lower flow rate as energy is produced 
over the lifespan of the well (Veil, 2015). By contrast, wastewater production of COG wells tends 
to be modest initially and may increase over time when water is used to enhance the energy 
productivity of mature wells.  
 
3.3 Empirical Method 
3.3.1 Difference-in-difference-in-differences Model 
To test whether UOG and COG wells have different lifecycles of wastewater production, we 
estimate the following equation to find out how the contemporaneous and cumulative wastewater 
production of the two types of wells varies with production age while controlling for other well-
level characteristics.  
(1) 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑔𝑎𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽3 log(𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑖𝑡) + 𝜎𝑢𝑜𝑔𝑖 + ∑ ∑ 𝜎𝑗𝑘𝑢𝑜𝑔𝑖 ∗ 𝐴𝑖𝑗 ∗
𝐽
𝑗=1
𝐾
𝑘=1
𝐶𝑖𝑘 + 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑦𝑖 + 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 ∗ 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 ∗ 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
where 𝑖 indexes well and 𝑡 indexes month. The variable 𝐴𝑖𝑗 is an age dummy equal to one if well 
𝑖 has an age of 𝑗 months. The variable 𝐶𝑖𝑘 is a cohort dummy that takes a value of one if well 𝑖 
starts production in the 𝑘𝑡ℎ  cohort year. The coefficient 𝜎  measures the initial difference in 
wastewater between new UOG and COG wells after they start to produce oil and gas in the baseline 
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cohort. The coefficients 𝜎𝑗𝑘 captures the additional difference in wastewater production between 
the two types of wells in the 𝑘𝑡ℎ cohort year when they both have an age of 𝑗 months.  
The model includes a dummy indicating a well’s resource type, 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖 , and a dummy 
indicating the dominant hydrocarbon type produced by the well, 𝑔𝑎𝑠𝑖 . It also controls for the 
effects of total oil and gas production by including log(𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑖𝑡) as an explanatory variable. We 
further include the county fixed effects, 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑦𝑖 , to allow for county-level time-invariant 
differences in geology and regulations, the state by year fixed effects,  𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 ∗ 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡, to control 
for state-specific time trends in oil price, and the state by operator fixed effects, 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 ∗
𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖, to consider the state-specific business model of different operators.  
 
3.3.2 Data and Descriptive 
We conduct this analysis using a proprietary well-level dataset through an academic use agreement 
with the Drillinginfo, Inc. The Drillinginfo collects oil and gas production data for 30 states in the 
United States for each well and month. We focus on the fracking boom period of 2008-2016 to 
construct a sample of wells at the month level.2 We retain the wells of 17 states in the U.S. that 
require oil and gas operators to report wastewater production.3 We restrict our sample to active 
onshore oil and gas wells with identifiable drill direction type. As some operators did not report 
                                                 
2 The US experienced the first jump in shale production in 2008 (US EIA, 2009). See more at  
https://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/ng_prod_shalegas_s1_a.htm  
3  These 17 states include Alabama, Arkansas, California, Coloradio, Florida, Michigan, Mississippi, 
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, and 
Wyoming.  
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wastewater production for all the wells of certain states in specific years, we exclude these 
observations to avoid systematic data reporting error. We also exclude wells that did not report 
any wastewater production over the sampling period. Besides, since large-scale commercial 
horizontal drilling was not successful until the 1990s (King and Morehouse, 1993), we exclude 
horizontal and directional wells that were reported to start production before 1990. We finally 
exclude wells switching between active production and shutdown during the lifespan to retain a 
balanced sample of wells with continuous production. 
We then project the geographic coordinates of each well onto the latest shale play 
shapefiles provided by the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) to identify whether a 
well is in shale regions.4 We define conventional wells as those with a drill direction of vertical 
and drilled in either shale or non-shale regions. We then define unconventional wells as those 
classified as horizontal or directional wells but located in shale regions only. Thereby, we exclude 
horizontal or directional wells drilled in non-shale regions, since oil and gas in these areas could 
be extracted with or without fracking with substantial uncertainty. If some UOG wells defined in 
this study did not use fracking or some COG wells did apply fracking in practice, then our 
estimated differences between the two types of wells would serve as a lower bound of the true 
impacts of unconventional techniques on wastewater production. Next, we define oil wells as those 
with an energy production type classification of Oil, and gas wells as those classified as Gas. We 
treat wells classified as “Oil&Gas” as either oil or gas wells depending on their dominant energy 
type during the sampling period. Finally, we convert each well’s oil production in barrel (bbl) and 
                                                 
4 The shapefiles are available at https://www.eia.gov/maps/maps.htm  
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gas production in thousand cubic feet (Mcf) to the energy equivalents in million British thermal 
units (mmBtu) to construct an aggregate measure of energy production.5  
We define the cohort of a well by the calendar year when the well started energy 
production. We then calculate the well’s age in month since the beginning of production. We trace 
each well’s production starting from the first month after the initial month when its energy and 
wastewater production was observed for a full month for the first time.6 For wells of cohort year 
𝑡, we track their monthly wastewater and energy production up to 12 ∗ (2016 − 𝑡) months so that 
all the wells of the cohort can be observed over the same number of months. Otherwise, wells 
starting production at the beginning of a cohort year would be observed over a longer lifespan 
compared to those starting production approaching the end of the year. Finally, we drop outlier 
wells whose wastewater production or wastewater-to-energy ratio was once greater than the 99th 
percentile and those whose energy production was once less than the 1st percentile of wells within 
the same production type, age, and cohort group. 
                                                 
5 According to the energy equivalents conversion criteria published by the EIA, 1000 cubic feet (mcf) of 
natural gas equals 1.037 mmBtu and a barrel of oil (bbl) equals 5.717 mmBtu. See more at 
https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/index.cfm/index.cfm?page=about_energy_conversion_calculator   
6 We find that in our sample wells started production almost equally likely on any day of a month. Thus, a 
well’s total production in the initial month only equals to about a half of a full month’s quantity. In addition, 
due to the existence of some “late-stage” wells that started production at the end of the initial month, the 
average energy and wastewater production we can observe in each month is higher than the true value 
because of the downwards trends of production. However, taking difference between UOG and COG wells 
across ages and cohorts can cancel out the bias.  
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Table 1 reports the summary statistics of the month-level sample over the period of 2008-
2016, which summarizes the well-level characteristics by UOG and COG wells. On average, 
UOG wells produced a higher amount of both wastewater and energy but had a lower 
wastewater-to-water ratio (0.119 bbl/mmBtu) compared to that of COG wells (0.415 
bbl/mmBtu). UOG wells were younger than COG wells measured by the average production age 
(30 months versus 35 months). Moreover, while gas wells were the dominant production type 
among UOG wells (64.7%), they consist of 40.1% of COG wells. Also, while 100% UOG wells 
were in shale regions by definition, the shale share in COG wells was about 54%. Finally, while 
the number of UOG wells were almost evenly distributed over the cohort years, the count of 
COG wells declined over cohorts.  
 
3.4 Empirical Results 
In this section, we report the estimated differences in wastewater production between UOG and 
COG wells over their lifespan using Equation (1). Table 2 reports the estimation results, where the 
dependent variables from Columns 1-3 are the log form of contemporaneous wastewater, the log 
form of cumulative wastewater, and the wastewater-to-energy ratio, respectively. We cluster the 
standard errors at the well level. Using the estimates obtained from each regression, we run a series 
of linear hypothesis tests on the null hypothesis of 𝜎 + 𝜎𝑗𝑘  = 0 to estimate the cohort- and age-
specific difference in each dependent variable between UOG and COG wells at age 𝑗 in cohort 𝑘. 
For cohort in year 𝑡 from 2008 to 2016, the tests generate 12 ∗ (2016 − 𝑡) estimates as each well 
in the cohort can be observed over the same number of months. 
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3.4.1 Contemporaneous wastewater production 
Figure 2 first plots the coefficients and the 95% confidence intervals of the estimated cohort- and 
age-specific difference in contemporaneous wastewater production between UOG and COG wells 
over their lifespan. A general pattern emerges from the figure that within a cohort the difference 
in contemporaneous wastewater production between the two types of wells always decreased with 
wells’ production age while across cohorts the initial difference switched from negative to positive 
with the magnitude being enlarged continuously.  
Specifically, among wells starting production before 2010, UOG wells produced a 
statistically similar or a significantly lower amount of wastewater than COG wells over their 
lifespan. In the cohort years of 2010 and 2011, the difference turned positive in the first six months 
of production, which were weakly significant, but remained significantly negative for the rest of 
lifespan. Since 2012, the positive difference has covered an increasingly more extended initial 
portion of lifespan at the significance level of 1%. The changing production pattern indicates that 
UOG wells have produced a higher amount of wastewater than COG wells in the initial stage of 
lifespan since then.  
This pattern persisted and became even more prominent for wells in younger cohorts, 
where the magnitude of the initial difference in wastewater production has increased continuously. 
Among wells in the 2012 cohort, for instance, the difference in wastewater production of the first 
month in lifespan was 0.25 at the significance level of 1%, which means that the initial volume of 
UOG wastewater became significantly higher than that of COG wells by 25%. Compared with the 
estimated difference of 0.009 for wells at the same age in the 2011 cohort, the increased initial 
difference indicates that wastewater production became more front-loaded due to the upfront water 
requirements for fracking in UOG production. In cohorts younger than 2012, the initial difference 
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between the two types of wells was even larger in magnitude. By cohort 2015, UOG wells had 
produced a significantly higher volume of wastewater than COG wells by over 70% in the first 
production month at the 1% significance level. The ever-growing initial difference across cohorts 
may result from the fact that a higher portion of new UOG wells defined in this study began to 
apply fracking in production as the technology matured and became more prevalent over time.   
Although the post-2011 cohorts displayed a positive initial difference in production 
between UOG and COG wells, the gap tends to close as wells age. In the 2012 and 2013 cohorts, 
after roughly two years of production, the estimated difference dropped in magnitude over age and 
turned insignificant, which indicates a statistically similar amount of wastewater produced by the 
two kinds of wells when they aged. As we can only observe a limited timeframe for both types of 
wells in younger cohorts, we cannot find the closure of the production gap between them for the 
last two cohorts. However, the cohort trends project that the contemporaneous gap in the last two 
cohorts declined even faster than before. Given the higher initial contemporaneous difference and 
the faster decline in the production gap between the two types of wells, the relative difference in 
cumulative wastewater production remains unclear. Thus, we further investigate the cumulative 
difference between UOG and COG wells in the next subsection.   
 
3.4.2 Cumulative wastewater production 
Figure 3 plots the coefficients and the 95% confidence intervals of the estimated cohort- and age-
specific difference in contemporaneous wastewater production between UOG and COG wells. The 
figure illustrates that, while the cumulative wastewater produced by UOG wells was significantly 
lower than that by COG wells throughout their lifespan in cohorts before 2010, it was not the case 
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for younger cohorts in which the cumulative difference between the two types of wells turned from 
positive to negative with the “breakeven” point being gradually delayed across cohorts.   
Specifically, for the 2008 and 2009 cohorts, the cumulative wastewater produced by UOG 
wells was statistically significantly lower than that by COG wells by 15% and 24% by the end of 
the observable lifespan respectively. These results are consistent with the findings that UOG wells 
produced a significantly lower contemporaneous amount of wastewater compared to COG wells 
in these cohorts. In the 2010 cohort, the estimated difference in cumulative wastewater turned 
positive in the initial months of production, which aligns with the findings in the contemporaneous 
difference that UOG wastewater production became more front-loaded in lifespan starting from 
this cohort. The estimation results show that the cumulative wastewater production by UOG wells 
exceeded that by COG wells by 8% at the first 12 months. We find consistent evidence that the 
initial difference between UOG and COG wells increased in magnitude continuously in younger 
cohorts. For example, at the end of the first year, while the cumulative gap between the two types 
of wells was 7.8% for the 2011 cohort, it rose to 86.2% for the 2015 cohort. 
However, the cumulative difference between UOG and COG wells declined in magnitude 
and finally turned negative as production continued over the lifespan of the well. In the 2010 
cohort, for instance, this estimated difference turned negative in the 42nd month of production. By 
the end of the observable lifespan in the cohort, i.e., the 72nd month, the cumulative wastewater by 
UOG wells was significantly lower than that produced by COG wells by 13.2% at the significance 
level of 1%. The findings indicate that, despite a higher cumulative volume at the initial stage of 
production, the cumulative lifespan production of UOG wells was significantly lower than that of 
COG wells. Moreover, we find that the “breakeven” point occurred later in more recent cohorts. 
While the estimated difference turned negative in the 47th month for the 2011 cohort, they stayed 
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positive throughout the entire observable lifespan for the 2012 cohort though the difference was 
decreasing toward zero. The delayed “breakeven” point is probably caused by the fact that UOG 
wells produced an increasingly higher amount of wastewater at the initial stage of lifespan in 
younger cohorts.  
 
3.4.3 Wastewater-to-energy ratio 
Finally, we test the cohort- and age-varying difference in wastewater-to-energy ratio between 
UOG and COG wells. We run a model specification excluding the variable of log(𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑖𝑡) from 
Equation (1). Using the parameter estimates obtained, Figure 4 plots the coefficients and the 95% 
confidence intervals for the estimates of the linear hypothesis test results of 𝜎 + 𝜎𝑗𝑘 = 0 at age 𝑗 
in cohort 𝑘. Overall, the results demonstrate that UOG wells were significantly more efficient than 
COG wells, as measured by the amount of wastewater per unit of energy produced, regardless of 
wells’ production age or cohort year. For example, among wells in the 2008 cohort, the ratio for 
UOG wells was lower than that of COG wells by -0.11 bbl/mmBtu at the significance level of 1%. 
The difference in ratio persisted over the entire lifespan of wells’ production, which indicates that 
wastewater volume always varied proportionally with energy production. Thus, we infer that the 
energy production of UOG wells was also concentrated within the initial few years of lifespan, 
which is similar to the distribution of wastewater production by these wells.  
For wells in younger cohorts, the difference in efficiency between the two types of wells 
was further enlarged in magnitude. In the 2015 cohort, the ratio for UOG wells was significantly 
lower than that for COG wells by -0.3 bbl/mmBtu. The findings indicate that, while both 
wastewater and energy production of UOG wells increased across cohorts due to the prevalence 
of fracking over time, energy production increased to a greater extent than wastewater output, 
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which led UOG production to be increasingly more efficient than COG wells concerning 
wastewater generation.  
 
3.5 Conclusions 
This study uses a comprehensive well-level dataset to estimate the impacts of unconventional 
production techniques of fracking and horizontal drilling on oil and gas wastewater production. 
We distinguish unconventional wells from conventional ones by wells’ drill type and resource type 
given that fracking is typically used in conjunction with horizontal drilling to extract shale energy. 
We estimate the cohort- and age-specific differences in wastewater production between UOG and 
COG wells to show how unconventional energy production has affected the quantity of wastewater 
produced by the two types of wells regarding the contemporaneous amount, the cumulative 
volume, and the water-to-energy ratio over a well’s lifespan and across different cohorts.  
This study contributes to the public discussions about the environmental costs and the 
management challenges presented by the fracking technique that has gained increased prevalence 
in the oil and gas industry. While it is perceived that shale energy development is relatively more 
wastewater intensive, we show the importance of taking a lifespan perspective in assessing the 
production of wastewater. Contrary to the prevailing perception, UOG wells turn out to be more 
efficient in production with a significantly lower wastewater-to-energy ratio than COG wells. The 
higher production efficiency implies a lower operating cost associated with each unit of energy 
extracted borne by energy operators. Moreover, we show that the cumulative wastewater amount 
produced by an average UOG well could be significantly lower than that of COG wells by the end 
of their lifespan. These findings point out that the rapid growth in wastewater generation since the 
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recent energy boom has been a consequence of the growth in the scale of production instead of the 
stimulation and drilling methods applied.  
Despite a lower per-well lifespan volume, we show that the wastewater production by UOG 
wells has become more concentrated and occurs upfront during the initial stage of a well’s life. 
We also find that there is a gradual delay in the point of reversal during a well’s life at which the 
difference in cumulative production between UOG and COG wells turns negative in more recent 
cohorts. Furthermore, considering the immense size of the ongoing fracking activities, UOG wells 
still generate a much higher overall amount of wastewater than COG wells, which may impose 
massive pressure on local infrastructure and wastewater treatment facilities especially when a large 
number of wells are in their initial stage of production concurrently. The issue is even more critical 
given that existing wastewater disposal capacity is being quickly saturated while only a small share 
of shale resources has been extracted to date (U.S. EIA, 2015). Through recognizing the cyclical 
pattern of wastewater production of UOG wells over their lifespan, local governments may design 
more effective regulations and management practices governing the permitting of new drilling 
activity. Regulations can be implemented on the number of new wells that can be drilled at a point 
in time to manage the outflow of wastewater and reduce the total volume of wastewater being 
disposed of within a given timeframe. Moreover, permitting of new wells should also incorporate 
the age distribution of existing wells along with the regional wastewater treatment capacity to help 
alleviate the impacts of fracking on local infrastructure and water quality.  
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3.6 Tables and Figures 
Table 3.1 Summary Statistics  
 
UOG Wells COG Wells 
 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
log (1+produced water) (bbl) 6.208 1.975 5.852 2.267 
log (energy production) (mmBtu) 9.462 1.110 8.214 1.234 
Wastewater-to-energy ratio (bbl/mmBtu) 0.119 0.287 0.415 0.965 
Production age (month) 29.901 22.162 34.681 24.045 
Gas well 0.647 0.478 0.401 0.490 
Shale 1.000 0.000 0.536 0.499 
Cohort of 2008 0.156 0.362 0.278 0.448 
Cohort of 2009 0.109 0.312 0.155 0.362 
Cohort of 2010 0.142 0.349 0.163 0.370 
Cohort of 2011 0.153 0.360 0.145 0.353 
Cohort of 2012 0.163 0.370 0.119 0.324 
Cohort of 2013 0.137 0.344 0.074 0.262 
Cohort of 2014 0.102 0.302 0.050 0.219 
Cohort of 2015 0.039 0.192 0.015 0.120 
N 
 
1,463,385 
 
871,439 
Notes: The table reports the summary statistics of the 2008-2016 monthly well-level sample.  
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Table 3.2 Age-varying Difference in Wastewater Volume and Efficiency  
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Log(1+wastewater) Log (1+cumulative  
wastewater) 
Wastewater-to- 
energy ratio 
Shale region -0.005 0.022 -0.110*** 
 (0.059) (0.061) (0.030) 
Gas well -0.887*** -0.936*** -0.107*** 
 (0.050) (0.054) (0.012) 
Log(energy) 0.704*** 0.460***  
 (0.007) (0.007)  
    
UOG dummy (σ) Yesi Yesii Yesiii 
UOG * Age * Cohort dummies (𝜎𝑗𝑘) Yes
i Yesii Yesiii 
County FE Yes Yes Yes 
State by year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Operator by state FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,334,803 2,334,803 2,334,803 
R-squared 0.589 0.608 0.377 
Notes: The table reports the estimation results using the 2008-2016 monthly well-level sample. The 
dependent variables are listed as the column title. Standard errors clustered at the well level are reported 
in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
i. The estimates of σ + 𝜎𝑗𝑘 are plotted in Figure 2. 
ii. The estimates of σ + 𝜎𝑗𝑘 are plotted in Figure 3. 
iii. The estimates of σ + 𝜎𝑗𝑘 are plotted in Figure 4. 
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Figure 3.1 The U.S. UOG and COG Wastewater Production, Well Counts, and New Wells’ 
Share 
 
Data sources: Summarized by authors using the data from the DrillingInfo.  
Notes: UOG wells refer to unconventional oil and gas wells, which are defined as horizontal wells in shale 
formations. COG wells refer to conventional oil and gas wells, which are defined as vertical wells regardless 
of location.  
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Figure 3.2 Log Difference in Contemporaneous Wastewater Production between UOG and 
COG Wells 
 
Notes: The figure plots the coefficient estimates and the 95% confidence intervals for the cohort- and age-
varying log difference in contemporaneous wastewater production between UOG and COG wells. The 
model controls for a well’s resource type, the dominant hydrocarbon type, log of energy production, the 
county fixed effects, the state-specific time trends, and the state- and operator-specific business model. The 
coefficient is interpreted as the difference in percentage terms ((UOG-COG)/COG).       
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Figure 3.3 Log Difference in Cumulative Wastewater Production between UOG and COG 
Wells 
 
Notes: The figure plots the coefficient estimates and the 95% confidence intervals for the cohort- and age-
varying difference in cumulative wastewater production between UOG and COG wells. The model controls 
for a well’s resource type, the dominant hydrocarbon type, log of energy production, the county fixed 
effects, the state-specific time trends, and the state- and operator-specific business model. The coefficient 
is interpreted as the difference in percentage terms ((UOG-COG)/COG).       
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Figure 3.4: Difference in Wastewater-to-energy Ratio (in bbl/mmBtu) between UOG and 
COG Wells 
 
Notes: The figure plots the coefficient estimates and the 95% confidence intervals for the cohort- and age-
varying difference in wastewater-to-energy ratio between UOG and COG wells. The model controls for a 
well’s resource type, the dominant hydrocarbon type, the county fixed effects, the state-specific time trends, 
and the state- and operator-specific business model. The coefficient is interpreted as the difference in barrels 
of wastewater per mmBtu of energy produced (UOG-COG).       
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CHAPTER 4 
FRACCIDENTS: THE IMPACT OF FRACKING ON ROAD TRAFFIC DEATHS 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The increased prevalence of hydraulic fracturing, a.k.a. fracking, has brought about a nationwide 
shale oil and gas extraction boom since the late 2000s. Accompanied by the massive economic 
benefits, however, the fracking boomtowns also bear a growing burden on local services and 
infrastructure. Over the decade of 2006-2015, the national fatal traffic crashes decreased by 17%, 
while many boomtowns witnessed a surge in road fatalities.7 Part of the spike might be explained 
by the growth in migrants and commuters in these towns since more traffic results in more 
accidents (Vickrey, 1968). However, a more concerning cause could be the heavy trucks servicing 
the energy sector, which give rise to more severe crashes and impose immense externalities on 
other road users (Li, 2012; Jacobsen, 2013; Anderson and Auffhammer, 2014; Muehlenbachs, 
Staubli, and Chu, 2017). Besides usual transport needs in drilling and production phases, fracking 
wells demand additional trucks to transport fracking fluid and liquid wastes, adding up to two to 
three times the truck trips required by conventional wells (Moss, 2008; Podulka and Podulka, 
                                                 
7  We calculate the change in national fatal crashes using data from the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration (NHTSA) at https://www-fars.nhtsa.dot.gov/Main/index.aspx. Meanwhile, Fractracker 
Alliance (2014) reports that from 2009 to 2013 the drilling counties in North Dakota, West Virginia, Texas, 
Pennsylvania, and New Mexico all experienced faster increase in traffic fatalities compared to non-drilling 
counties within each state. See more at https://www.fractracker.org/2014/09/truck-counts/  
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2010; New York State Department of Transportation (NYSDOT), 2011). Thus, the truck traffic 
associated with fracking per se may have brought massive accident externalities to road safety.  
This study estimates a fixed-effect Poisson model to disentangle the effects of fracking-
related transport from that of confounding activities on the increased traffic crashes in energy 
boomtowns. We focus on a very local area surrounding each road segment. With road segment 
fixed effects, we effectively exploit the temporal variations in truck traffic within a road segment 
induced by the exogenous timing of fracking operations nearby to identify the impacts of fracking-
induced water trucking. Fracking, usually combined with horizontal drilling, occurs within a few 
days at the end of well completion to release oil and gas from shale rocks (Drillinginfo, 2014; 
Finkel, 2015; Muehlenbachs, Staubli, and Chu, 2017). Trucks are in high demand both during and 
after the process to convey water, fracking materials, and liquid wastes, which account for over 
90% of all the truck traffic from a well over its productive life (NYSDOT, 2011). Within a buffer 
area of a given road segment, we count the number of horizontal wells completed in the current 
month (“fracking wells”) to capture the truck trips associated with fracking fluid injection. We 
then count the number of nearby horizontal wells one month after completion (“post-fracking 
wells”) to measure the truck use related to fracking wastewater hauling. The identification strategy 
assumes that the timing of fracking is exogenous to the existing traffic status and that a road 
segment is more likely to be used by nearby wells than distant ones. We control for other traffic 
vehicles servicing wells’ drilling and production phases using the number of spudding and 
producing wells respectively that include both horizontal and vertical wells. As monthly varying 
control variables at the road segment level rarely exist, we include county-specific time trends to 
control for the time-varying population and local policies and year-specific seasonality to control 
for market conditions and weather.  
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This study takes empirical evidence from the 2006-2014 oil and gas wells and fatal 
highway crashes in North Dakota, which experienced significant shale oil reserves development 
since 2006 (Nordeng, 2010). The estimation results of a fixed-effect Poisson model show a 
significant increase in fatal accidents at the post-fracking phase. Precisely, within a baseline buffer 
of six miles of a road segment, every additional post-fracking well increased the count of fatal 
crashes involving large trucks by 7.5%. Besides, the post-fracking activity also led to more severe 
accidents measured by a higher monetary loss per person.  
We further show that in the baseline buffer each additional post-fracking well was 
associated with an additional 3,289 vehicles in the year when it was fracked but did not affect the 
accident rate. Although the traffic volume data are not available at the month level, we believe that 
the increased traffic counts were more likely to occur immediately after well completion rather 
than being evenly distributed across the year. We also show that wells’ post-fracking transport 
significantly increased the incidence of daytime accidents during both rush and non-rush hours but 
not nighttime crashes. Our findings indicate that the increased fatal crashes were due to a higher 
traffic amount induced by fracking activities rather than a higher accident rate. Although we find 
weak evidence of a higher chance of drowsy driving with post-fracking operations nearby, we do 
not identify any significant association between well operations and other risky behaviors of the 
crash drivers.    
This study expands the literature that explores the factors influencing the incidence and 
severity of road fatalities. Existing studies focus on various aspects of road safety, such as the 
amount of traffic (Romen and Shurtz, 2016), text messaging bans (Abouk and Adams, 2013), 
minimum wage (Adams, Blackburn, and Cotti, 2012), drunk driving (Levitt and Porter, 2011), 
compulsory insurance regulations and no-fault liability laws (Cohen and Dehejia, 2004), seat belt 
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use (Cohen and Einav, 2003), and police enforcement (Deangelo and Hansen, 2014). A particularly 
active research area is the accident externality of heavyweight vehicles (Li, 2012; Jacobsen, 2013; 
Anderson and Auffhammer, 2014; Muehlenbachs, Staubli, and Chu, 2017). The study that is most 
related to ours is Muehlenbachs, Staubli, and Chu (2017), who estimate the traffic impacts of heavy 
trucks related to fracking using quarterly variations in traffic volume and crashes on the routes that 
connect wells, water withdrawal points, and wastewater disposal points. Our analysis differs from 
their study by exploiting more precise variations at the road segment-month level where the 
fracking-related traffic is proxied by the number of fracking and post-fracking wells in a buffer 
zone. We show that it is the first month after fracking that is subject to most externalities of truck 
transport, which complements Muehlenbachs, Staubli, and Chu (2017) who examine the traffic 
impacts arising from the whole season of fracking. While they find that fracking increased both 
truck and non-truck crashes but did not affect the severity of the accidents, we identify that fracking 
not only increased the count of large-truck crashes but also led to more fatalities and more critical 
injuries. Moreover, our driver-level analysis examines driver behaviors in shale energy extraction, 
which has not been investigated in the current studies.  
 
4.2 Empirical Method   
4.2.1 Operational Phases of A Fracking Well 
Fracking is a stimulation technology intended to enhance the productivity of oil and gas wells. The 
process involves pumping a high-pressure mixture of sand, chemicals, and large volumes of water 
to prop open underground cracks and allow the flow of gas, oil, salt water, and fracking fluids to 
wells. Its application used to be limited to mature fields and conventional geological formations 
until the early 2000s when fracking started to be combined with horizontal drilling to explore shale 
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resources (Morton, 2013; Wang and Krupnick, 2013). The rapid increase in the combined use of 
the two technologies prompted large-scale shale exploration in the Bakken Formation of North 
Dakota since 2006 (Nordeng, 2010).  
Fracking is a water-intensive process – up to six million gallons of water is required to be 
injected into a wellhead as the base fluid (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 2016). 
Shortly after the process, up to 70 percent of the injected fluids discharge back out of the well 
together with naturally occurring water trapped in formations (EPA, 2015). Both fracking water 
supply and waste collection depend mainly on heavy trucks; hence, fracking generates a substantial 
freight demand during and after the process.  
A conventional oil and gas well experiences three operational phases, including drilling, 
well completion, and production (DrillingInfo, 2014). Panel A of Figure 1 illustrates that trucks 
are needed to serve the stage-specific transport purpose throughout the entire lifespan of a well. 
Operators start drilling a well from removing rock, dirt and other sedimentary material with drill 
bits, which is called spud. The whole drilling phase lasts about 80 days (Muehlenbachs, Staubli, 
and Chu, 2017), during which multiple truck trips are needed to transport drilling rigs and other 
equipment. After finishing drilling a well, operators may wait for favorable market conditions to 
prepare the newly drilled wells for production in the phase of well completion (Smith, 2017). When 
extracting conventional formations, well completion consists of casing and perforation only, after 
which oil and gas can flow out readily (DrillingInfo, 2014).  
Shale energy extraction differs from conventional practice in that fracking stimulation is 
necessary to release trapped oil and gas before production begins. As is shown in Panel B of Figure 
1, the fracking process lasts about 3-5 days at the end of well completion until oil and gas start to 
flow from the formations into the wells (Coloradans for Responsible Energy Development 
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(CRED), 2014). Over an average fracking period of 3 days, up to 2,300 truck trips are needed to 
fulfill the logistics demand of water supply (NYSDOT, 2011). Moreover, the demand for trucks 
continues to be high within a few weeks after well completion, as a vast volume of wastewater 
needs to be collected and transported to disposal sites. On average, the volume of fracking 
wastewater at the initial months of production is more than twice the amount generated by 
conventional wells in the same production phase (Xu, Xu, and Khanna, 2017). Later on, 
wastewater diminishes in volume rapidly and keeps being returned as byproducts of energy at a 
considerably lower daily flow rate (Veil, 2015), which indicates that the truck demand becomes 
much less intense throughout the rest of the well’s production.  
 
4.2.2 Exogenous Variations in Truck Traffic at the Road Segment Level 
This study exploits the temporal shocks to truck traffic induced by fracking activities near a road 
segment. Unlike Muehlenbachs, Staubli, and Chu (2017), we do not explicitly identify the routes 
used by fracking wells to transport water from the withdrawal sites and haul wastewater to the 
disposal sites. Instead, we measure fracking-related truck traffic by the intensity of fracking 
activities within a buffer zone of each road segment. Figure 2 shows that a buffer zone is defined 
by the distance from a buffer’s border to a road segment. Our analysis depends on three 
identification assumptions. First, we assume that the timing of a well’s drilling, fracking, and 
production depends largely on local geology and market conditions. In our sampling area that 
belongs to the Bakken Formation of North Dakota, the fracking technique is mostly combined with 
horizontal drilling to extract shale resources (Nordeng, 2010). To identify the onset of fracking 
activities, we use horizontal wells’ completion month to infer when fracking occurs, exploiting the 
fact that fracking takes place within a few days at the end of well completion phase (CRED, 2014; 
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DrillingInfo, 2014). Thus, we treat horizontal wells completed in the current month as fracking 
wells and those completed in the previous month as wells fracked one month before. Since the 
transport demand of horizontal and vertical wells are similar in drilling and production phases, we 
consider wells of both drill types when counting spudding wells and producing wells.  
Second, we assume that wells closer to a road segment are more likely to use it for transport 
purpose compared to more distant wells. Admittedly, wells at a distance may still affect the traffic 
nearby when drivers avoid heavy traffic near the well sites or trucks servicing multiple well sites 
converge to an interstate far away from the well sites (Muehlenbachs, Staubli, and Chu, 2017). 
However, we expect the probability to decrease with the distance from the road segment to the 
wells. To demonstrate this point, we show distance-decaying effects of fracking activities on the 
count of fatal crashes as a robustness check. Alternatively, if wells included in the buffer areas did 
not use the road in reality, our method would produce a lower-bound estimate of the true impact 
of fracking per well.  
Third, we assume that the associated traffic demand in each phase is a linear function of 
the well counts of different statuses given the fairly homogeneous geology in the Bakken Shale 
formation. While the traffic associated with each well may also capture commute vehicles, the 
frequency of commute traffic is much lower than that of truck traffic servicing the fracking process. 
Particularly, since over 98% of the oil and gas workforce are in the pre‐drilling and drilling phase 
(Brundage et al., 2011), the traffic impacts near the fracking stage is less likely to be confounded 
by commute vehicles. In our analysis, we use county-specific time trends to capture the confounder 
of commute traffic. We further narrow down to large-truck crashes to pinpoint the impact of 
fracking-related truck traffic. We also examine the incidence of fatal accidents in the rush hours 
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when commute vehicles were concentrated on the road to rule out the potential confounding effects 
of commute traffic.   
 
4.2.3 Empirical Model 
We estimate the effects of fracking-related truck traffic on the expected count of the fatal auto-
vehicle crash using the following fixed-effect Poisson model:  
(1) 𝐸(𝑦𝑖𝑡|𝑋) = exp (𝛽1𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑠𝑝𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜂𝑡 + 𝜇𝑐𝑡) 
where each observation is a road segment associated with the number of wells in each operational 
phase within the defined buffer area and the count of fatal traffic crashes on the road. The index 𝑖 
denotes road segment, and the index 𝑡 signifies year-month. The dependent variable is the count 
of fatal traffic accidents by vehicle type. The coefficients of 𝛽1, 𝛽2, 𝛽3, and 𝛽4 are interpreted as 
the differences in logs of the expected crash counts for a one-unit increase in the number of wells 
in the corresponding status. Specifically, we count the number of horizontal wells completed in 
the current month, 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑡, to capture the logistics activities in well completion at the end of which 
fracking stimulation occurs. Note that fracking wastewater transport may also take place during 
the completion month for some wells whose fracking process was finished earlier in the month. 
Next, the number of horizontal wells completed in the last month, 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑡−1, captures the traffic 
related to wastewater collection after fracking for most wells, as large volumes of wastewater 
return to the surface within a few weeks after well completion. For a small share of wells that were 
completed at the very end of last month, however, the variable also captures part of their fracking 
fluid delivery that was not finished until the current month.  
We further capture the equipment transport needs arising from the drilling phase by the 
number of newly drilled wells, 𝑠𝑝𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡. The variable helps capture the confounding effects caused 
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by labor commute vehicles since a dominant percentage of oil and gas employment is created at 
drilling stage (Brundage et al., 2011). We further control the traffic related to regular oil and gas 
production by the number of wells that have been producing oil and gas actively, 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑡. Older 
producing wells require fewer truck trips due to a lower wastewater volume generated (Xu, Xu, 
and Khanna, 2017). As the average age of producing wells increases with the number of wells 
accumulated over months, a higher number of producing wells could be associated with a lower 
traffic impact. However, road segments without any producing wells nearby should be safer overall 
compared to those with some producing wells, since the former is free of any traffic related to 
energy production. Thus, we expect the sign of the coefficient of 𝛽4 to be uncertain. 
We control for the road segment fixed effects, 𝛼𝑖, to eliminate the permanent differences 
across road segments, such as road capacity, the functional classifications, the access to disposal 
sites and water withdrawal sites, etc. We also control for the year by season fixed effects, 𝜂𝑡, to 
capture the seasonality in weather conditions and market conditions that are common to the whole 
drilling areas.8 Finally, we control for the county by year fixed effects, 𝜇𝑐𝑡, to deal with the county-
specific time trends. The county by year fixed effects enable us to disentangle the traffic directly 
related to fracking from confounders in the energy boomtowns, such as the construction of new 
hotels, the influx of migrants and commuters, the year-specific changes in county-level 
                                                 
8 While the year-month fixed effects can control for monthly variations in market and weather conditions, 
the fixed-effects Poisson model controlling for them together with the road segment and the year-county 
fixed effects doesn’t converge well. Thus, we use the year-season fixed effects instead, though the results 
of using year-month fixed effects with either road segment or year-county fixed effects are also consistent 
with our baseline findings. For all the linear models we run later of the study, we use the year-month fixed 
effects, which can capture the more precise monthly trends than the seasonal trends.   
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demography and local regulations and policies, etc. Note that controlling for fixed effects in a non-
linear model may lead the observations without any variations within the fixed-effect groups to 
drop out of the sample. Thus, we test the sensitivity of the baseline model to different samples 
selected by the fixed-effect groups in the robustness check section.  
 
4.3 DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
4.3.1 Well-level Data 
We use proprietary well-level data from the Drillinginfo Inc., which provides comprehensive 
information for all the U.S. oil and gas wells, including geographic location, drill type, spud date, 
completion date, and monthly energy and wastewater production. We focus on the period of 2006-
2014 when fracking and horizontal drilling had been used combinedly to develop the oil reserves 
in the Bakken Formation in North Dakota. We restrict the sample to active oil and gas wells with 
non-zero energy production reported in the Drillinginfo data.  
Due to the lack of a direct measure of the fracking status of each well, we identify wells’ 
drilling and fracking status using the spud date and the completion date respectively. The former 
indicates the commencement date to drill a new well, while the latter denotes the date when a well 
finishes the completion phase. On average, wells’ spud date is four months ahead of the completion 
date. We then identify producing wells by wells’ production status. Over 95% of wells are recorded 
to start production from the beginning of the month of completion.9 We exclude the wells that 
entered the production phase in the recent two months from producing wells to avoid double 
                                                 
9 As all the wells’ production date starts from the first day of a month, which might be inexact, we do not 
use the information to infer when fracking happens. 
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counting since the transport demand of these wells has been captured by wells completed in the 
current and the previous month.  
 
4.3.2 Traffic Crash Data 
We obtain the data regarding fatal traffic crashes from the Fatality Analysis Reporting System 
(FARS) of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA). The FARS data provide 
a nationwide census of the fatal auto-vehicle crashes that involve a motor vehicle traveling on a 
public trafficway and result in the death of a motorist or a non-motorist within 30 days of the 
accident. For each traffic accident, the FARS data report the timing and location, the environmental 
conditions at the time of the crash, the in-transport motor vehicles involved, and the demographic 
features of drivers, passengers, pedestrians, and pedal cyclists. The FARS data also distinguish the 
accidents including at least one large truck from those involving passenger cars, light trucks 
(pickup, utility, van, or other), motorcycles, or buses only. In our analysis, we define the former 
as large-truck crashes and the latter as non-truck crashes, which account for roughly 35% and 65% 
of the total crashes, respectively.   
We calculate the monetary loss of the crashes using the Value of a Statistical Life (VSL). 
The VSL measures individuals’ marginal willingness to pay to reduce the expected number of 
fatalities by one, which is estimated to be 9.2 million in 2014 dollars by the U.S. Department of 
Transportation (DOT) (2016). The benefits of preventing injuries of each degree are then assessed 
at an estimated fraction of the VSL depending on the severity extent, as indicated by minor, 
moderate, serious, severe, or critical. Since the FARS data classify the severity of injuries only by 
non-incapacitating or incapacitating, we treat the former as minor or moderate injuries and the 
latter as serious, severe, or critical injuries, and then take the average costs of injuries in each 
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category. The costs of non-incapacitating and incapacitating injuries are thus estimated to be 0.025 
and 0.349 of the VSL respectively. The total monetary loss of a crash, therefore, equals the 
aggregated VSL of the fatalities and the injuries of different severity in the accident. We also 
measure the severity of an accident by the average monetary loss per person, which includes the 
deaths, the injured, and the noninjured in the accident. 
Figure 3 plots the 2001-2014 annual count of fracking wells and fatal traffic crashes by 
vehicle type in the oil and gas producing counties of North Dakota. Both large-truck crashes and 
non-truck crashes show an increasing trend over the years, which reflects the massive influx of 
population and vehicles in the boomtowns since the mid-2000s. By comparison, the count of 
crashes involving large trucks follows the time trends of fracking wells more closely. In 2013, 
large-truck crashes outnumbered non-truck accidents for the first time, suggesting that heavy 
trucks have imposed significant accident externalities on these towns.  
We project the location of all the 2006-2014 fatal auto-vehicle crashes and active oil and 
gas wells onto the North Dakota highway system in Figure 4. 10  The covered highway road 
segments include interstate, state, and county highways. We focus on the crashes that occurred 
within 300 feet from the centerline of each road segment, which might be right on the highways 
or on the highway-entrance or -exit ramps. In total, we identify 340 fatal auto-vehicle crashes 
involving 565 motor vehicles for analysis. Moreover, we find that most wells are located in the 
Bakken and Three Forks Shale formations in North Dakota, in which roughly 78% of the wells are 
horizontal while the remaining 22% are vertical. The longest distance between a well and the 
nearest highway road segment is approximately twelve miles. Thus, we first choose a maximum 
                                                 
10 We use the shapefiles provided by the Highway Performance Monitoring System (HPMS) public release 
at https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policyinformation/hpms/shapefiles.cfm.  
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buffer of twelve miles so that each well belongs to the buffer area of at least one road segment. 
After we apply the search radius, we have 1,392 road segments with at least one well in the buffer 
zone.  
 
4.4 Main Results 
4.4.1 Fatal Traffic Crashes Increased After Fracking 
We begin by estimating the effects of fracking operations within the estimated baseline buffer of 
six miles of a road segment on the expected count of fatal auto-vehicle crashes using equation (1). 
Table 2 reports the results of a fixed-effect Poisson model, where we control for the road segment 
fixed effects, the county by year fixed effects, and the year by season fixed effects. The dependent 
variables are the count of total fatal traffic crashes (Column 1), large-truck crashes (Column 2), 
and non-truck crashes (Column 3). The number of observations is dropped automatically when the 
outcome variables have all zero values within the fixed-effect groups. We cluster the standard 
errors by road segment to account for correlations over time within each road segment.  
In Table 2, the coefficients are interpreted as the differences in the logs of the expected 
traffic crash count for a one-unit increase in the number of wells in each status, all else being equal. 
The results in Column 1 show that across well operations in each phase it is the post-completion 
phase that is associated with a significant increase in fatal auto-vehicle crashes. Specifically, given 
a one-unit increase in the number of post-fracking wells, the total crash count is expected to 
increase by a factor of 1.068 (= exp(0.066)), holding the other variables constant. The estimate 
is statistically significant at the 1% level. Meanwhile, every one-unit increase in the number of 
fracking wells decreased the expected total crash count slightly by a factor of 0.996 ( =
exp(−0.004)), which is statistically insignificant. We interpret the surge in fatal crashes one 
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month after well completion as a result of the intense truck trips collecting and transporting 
wastewater after fracking. Although we do not find any significant traffic impacts in the fracking 
phase, the results are probably caused by the exclusion of local roads from our sample. While 
highways usually constitute fracking waste disposal routes, local roads serve as water withdrawal 
routes more often (Muehlenbachs, Staubli, and Chu, 2017). As this study focuses on highways, we 
cannot capture the effects of water sourcing on local roads during the fracking process.  
By contrast, a one-unit increase in the number of spudding wells increased the mean crash 
count by a factor of 1.027 (= exp(0.027)), which is statistically insignificant. We also find that 
each additional producing well slightly decreased the crash count by a factor of 0.995 
(= exp(−0.005)) at the significance level of 10%. The negative coefficient of producing wells 
should be taken with caution, however, because of the small magnitude of the estimate and the 
weak statistical evidence. As the direction of the effects of producing wells is expected to be 
uncertain, we do observe that the coefficient becomes positive and statistically insignificant in 
some other model specifications.  
We further distinguish the fatal crashes by the type of vehicles involved to examine the 
role played by large trucks in well operations. If the increased fatal accidents indeed resulted from 
the trucks conveying fracking wastewater after well completion, we would identify a significant 
increase in large-truck crashes. However, non-truck crashes may also increase as passenger car 
drivers try to avoid trucks even though trucks are not directly involved in the crashes. The 
coefficient estimates in Column 2 show that, given a one-unit increase in the number of post-
fracking wells, the count of large-truck crashes is expected to increase by a factor of 1.075 
(= exp(0.072)) at the 5% level. The findings support our interpretation that the increased fatal 
accidents at the post-fracking phase were caused by intense truck trips hauling wastewater. Similar 
105 
 
to the findings in total traffic crashes, we do not identify any significant impacts on fatal crashes 
due to wells’ drilling and production activities. Likewise, although the number of fracking wells 
is expected to increase large-truck crashes by a factor of 1.014 (= exp(0.014), the estimate is 
statistically insignificant. Column 3 shows that wells’ activities across all the operational phases 
did not have any significant effects on non-truck crashes. However, by comparison, the estimates 
of the impacts on non-truck crashes are less precisely measured as shown by the larger standard 
errors, which prevents us from drawing a firm conclusion about the effects of fracking operations 
on non-truck crashes.  
 
4.4.2 Robustness Tests for the Total Crash Count  
Including Road Segments that Never Had an Accident. As we use the fixed-effect Poisson 
model in the baseline estimation, the road segments without any fatal crashes are dropped out of 
the sample due to lack of intertemporal variations. Thus, the baseline model does not incorporate 
the information from these observations. To understand the extent to which excluding these road 
segments could bias our estimates, we estimate a Poisson model excluding the road segment fixed 
effects while keeping the county by year and the season by year fixed effects (Column 1 of Table 
3). The results show that an additional post-fracking well increased the expected count of total 
fatal crashes by a factor of 1.061 (= exp(0.059)) at the 5% level. The estimate is of similar 
magnitude compared with the baseline estimate. Hence, including the road segments that never 
experienced any accident does not change our conclusion about the impacts of post-fracking 
transport on road safety.  
Vertical Wells As Counterfactual. Next, we expect that without fracking process well 
operations during and after the well completion phase would be much less truck intensive and thus 
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affect the traffic outcomes to a lesser extent. We use vertical wells’ completion activities as a 
counterfactual. Since fracking a vertical well is less profitable than fracking a horizontal one, 
operators have lower economic incentives to apply fracking to vertical wells (Morton, 2013). We 
add the number of vertical wells completed in the current and the previous month to the baseline 
model and report the results in Column 2 of Table 3. The estimates of the two variables, 0.061 and 
-0.597 respectively, are statistically insignificant, implying that operations of vertical wells did not 
have any significant effects on traffic crashes during or following the completion phase. 
Meanwhile, the number of horizontal wells completed in the last month still significantly increased 
the count of fatal accidents. Our findings show that the increased fatal crashes in the first month 
after well completion were less likely to be caused by any activities other than fracking-related 
trucking.  
Persistent Effects of Fracking Waste Trucking. The baseline model assumes that most 
wells’ fracking activities occurred in the same month when they were completed based on the fact 
that fracking occurs within a few days at the end of well completion. However, exceptions may 
occur to a small share of wells fracked at the end of a month and finishing the completion phase 
at the beginning of the next month. Thus, we test the validity of our assumption by adding one lead 
term of the number of completed wells to the baseline model. Meanwhile, we explore the persistent 
effects of transport following the fracking process by further adding the number of horizontal wells 
completed two months ago. We expect wells’ demand for truck trips to decrease rapidly over time 
since the volume of fracking wastewater reduces greatly within a few weeks after well completion 
(Veil, 2015). Column 3 of Table 3 shows that, while we identify significant traffic impacts of 
wells’ activities one month after completion, we do not find statistical evidence to conclude any 
persistent effects on traffic outcomes beyond the first month. Neither do we identify any significant 
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effects of well operations one month before the completion month. The results reveal the 
temporally intense nature of fracking-related water trucking.  
Distance-decaying Effects of Fracking Waste Trucking. Next, we vary the buffer distance 
mile by mile up to twelve miles away from each road segment and re-run the baseline model using 
each buffer. We expect that including more distant wells in larger buffers would lower the average 
effects of wells’ activities within the buffer if wells farther away are less likely to use a road 
segment. We compile the estimates and the 95% confidence intervals for the coefficients of post-
fracking wells from twelve regressions in Figure 7. The figure shows that, given a one-unit increase 
in the number of post-fracking wells within one mile, the count of fatal crashes increased by a 
factor of 1.185 (= exp(0.170)). As the buffer’s border is extended, the marginal effects drop to 
1.068 ( = exp(0.066) ) at six miles and finally to 0.986 ( = exp(−0.014) ) at twelve miles. 
Moreover, when buffers are large enough, the magnitudes of the estimates become too small to 
conclude any significant effects. The results show that the traffic impacts of wells’ fracking 
operations decayed with the distance to a road segment, which implies a distance-decreasing 
chance to use the road.  
 
4.4.3 Increased Monetary Loss and Intensified Severity Due to Fracking 
In this subsection, we estimate the monetary loss of the fracking-related traffic crashes associated 
with one more post-fracking well. In Table 4, we examine both the total monetary loss of fatalities 
and injuries (Columns 1-3) and the average loss per person on each road segment (Columns 4-6). 
Since both variables are right-skewed continuous, we take the inverse hyperbolic since (IHS) 
transformation of the variables following Muehlenbachs, Staubli, and Chu (2017). We then 
estimate a log-linear model that controls for the same fixed effects as the baseline model.  
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Column 1 shows that every additional post-fracking well increased the total monetary loss 
of fatal crashes by 1.1% at the 5% level. Columns 2-3 further show that, while wells’ post-fracking 
activities led to significantly higher financial damage in large-truck accidents, the effects were 
statistically insignificant for non-truck crashes. Next, Column 4 shows that every additional post-
fracking wells increased the average monetary loss per person by 1% at the 5% level. The results 
indicate that the intense truck trips serving fracking-related water hauling not only increased the 
count of traffic accidents but also led to more severe crashes that involved more fatalities and more 
critical injuries. The findings align with the fact that the larger weight, frame, and height, as well 
as the rigidity of heavy trucks can elevate the extent of damage inflicted on the crash vehicles 
(Anderson and Auffhammer, 2014). Columns 5-6 show that wells’ post-fracking transport only 
intensified the severity of large-truck crashes but not non-truck accidents, which is consistent with 
the findings in the total monetary loss and crash count.  
 
4.4.4 Search for the Baseline Buffer Cutoff 
We assume that the traffic on a road segment can be affected by the operating activities of wells 
nearby but to a varying degree depending on the distance to the well. We seek a baseline buffer 
for each road segment so that beyond the buffer’s border well operations only have minimal effects 
or no effects on traffic of the road. To search for the ideal distance cutoff, we draw twelve buffers 
with the borders ranging from one mile to twelve miles surrounding every road segment. We treat 
the areas between the boundaries of two adjacent buffers as a ring. We then estimate the number 
of fracking wells, post-fracking wells, spudding wells, and producing wells in each of the twelve 
rings on the count of fatal crashes in one fixed-effect Poisson model.  
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The estimation results show that the number of post-fracking wells in closer rings 
significantly affected the count of large-truck crashes. In Figure 5, we plot the estimates and the 
95% confidence intervals for the coefficients of the number of post-fracking wells in each of the 
twelve rings. For instance, the traffic impacts were significant at the 5% level for wells 1 mile 
away from the road segments and were statistically insignificant for wells 2 miles away. Overall, 
the figure shows that the post-fracking activities farther away from a road segment had smaller 
effects on fatal crashes on the road. Beyond six miles from a road segment, the number of post-
fracking wells in each ring turns to be negatively correlated with the crash count with the 
magnitude of the estimates close to zero. Driven by the pattern emerging from the results, we first 
select six miles as a baseline distance cutoff to estimate the average effects of well operations 
within the buffer. In a robustness test, we relax the cutoff restriction to show how the selection of 
different buffers may affect the estimates.  
 
4.4.5 Summary Statistics 
Table 1 reports the summary statistics of the baseline sample. We find that the sample mean of 
total traffic crashes is 0.002, while the sample variance also approximates to 0.002 (= 0.0482). 
The distribution of the dependent variable thus obeys the assumption required by the Poisson 
distribution (mean equals variance). The same property holds for truck and non-truck crashes as 
well, which justifies the selection of a Poisson model. Also, we find that the count of daytime 
crashes, nighttime crashes, rush-hour crashes, and non-rush crashes all ranges between 0 and 1 
with an average of 0.001. The table also shows that on average each road segment is subject to a 
total monetary loss of $26,362 due to traffic fatalities and injuries every month, among which 
$11,028 occurred to truck crashes while $15,334 occurred to non-truck crashes. Moreover, the 
110 
 
average monetary loss per person on each road segment is $12,778, while that of truck and non-
truck crashes is $4,494 and $8,315, respectively. Within six miles of each road segment, we find 
that horizontal wells account for more than 98% of both spudding and completed wells, while its 
share is about 60% among producing wells. The findings indicate that horizontal wells constitute 
a dominant percentage in new wells. Moreover, less than one well is drilled and completed every 
month, while about 40 wells are engaged in active oil and gas production on average.  
Figure 6 demonstrates the seasonal pattern of fatal traffic crashes and wells’ drilling and 
fracking activities, in which we calculate the monthly number of wells and fatal crashes in our 
sample over a one-year cycle. The figure shows that non-truck crashes took place less frequently 
in winter, staying at around ten times every month from December to the next March and rising to 
about twenty counts per month throughout the rest of the year. By comparison, the incidence of 
large-truck crashes is distributed more evenly across the months, which may result from the 
continuous truck trips serving the oil and gas industry throughout the whole year. The figure also 
shows that the number of spudding wells stayed at a constant level in the first three seasons and 
slightly decreased in the last season. Meanwhile, the number of fracking wells tended to be smaller 
in the first two seasons and then rose to a higher level in the second half of the year. Overall, well 
operations were smooth across the year without a sharp increase in magnitude or concentration in 
certain months.  
 
4.5 Mechanisms 
4.5.1 Traffic Volume vs. Accident Rate 
This section explores the potential mechanisms through which the fatal traffic crashes took place. 
We start with investigating the impacts of fracking on traffic volume and traffic accident rate, as 
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the count of accidents on the road is a function of both traffic amount and per-vehicle risk of getting 
into an accident (Romen and Shurtz, 2016). Since the total traffic counts data are available only 
annually from 2011 to 2014, we perform the analysis at the annual level using a subsample over 
the period. The key explanatory variable is the number of wells ever completed during the year, 
which measures the intensity of wells’ fracking activities. The control variables include the number 
of wells that were drilled and those that had started regular production since the last year.  
We first estimate the effects of fracking on traffic volume using a log-linear model 
controlling for the county by year fixed effects and the road segment fixed effects. We find that, 
given a one-unit increase in the number of fracking wells, the annual total traffic counts increased 
by 0.3% at the significance level of 1% (Column 1 of Table 5). The estimated percentage change 
is equivalent to an increase in the yearly cumulative traffic counts by 3,289, which could involve 
the vehicles trucking water for both fracking injection and wastewater collection. These vehicles 
were highly likely to be concentrated within a tight time frame near the well completion date 
instead of being evenly distributed across the months, which thus may generate a substantial 
impact on the roads with limited traffic capacity. Also, we find that an additional producing well 
near a road also increased the annual traffic counts by 0.1% at the significance level of 5%.  
We then estimate the same model using three types of accident rate as dependent variables, 
including the count of total crashes per million vehicle miles traveled (VMT), truck crashes per 
million VMT, and non-truck crashes per million VMT. The results are reported in Columns 2-4 of 
Table 5 respectively. We do not find any significant effects of fracking activities on any accident 
rate, which indicates that fatal crashes grew proportionately with traffic volume without elevating 
the accident rate. We thus conclude that the increased fatal crashes resulted from a higher traffic 
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amount induced by fracking-related vehicles rather than a higher chance of accident given the 
traffic intensity.  
 
4.5.2 Timing of the Increased Fatal Crashes 
Next, we investigate how fracking operations have affected the timing of fatal crashes. We first 
distinguish daytime crashes from night crashes by defining the former to be the crashes taking 
place between 5am-9pm and the latter to be those occurring in the rest of the day. Next, for each 
road segment observed in a particular month, we count daytime and night crashes. Since both 
variables turn out to take values of either 0 or 1, we treat them as dummy variables and run a linear 
probability model to estimate the effects of well operations on the likelihood of each type of 
crashes. We rescale the count of wells in each status to be in 100 to facilitate reporting the estimated 
coefficients. 
Table 6 shows that each additional post-fracking well significantly increased the likelihood 
of fatal daytime crashes by 0.042 percents at the significance level of 5% (Column 1). As the 
sample average incidence of fatal daytime crashes is roughly 0.15%, each post-fracking well 
increased the likelihood of this type of crashes by 28% (=  0.042/0.15). In particular, given a 
one-unit increase in post-fracking wells, the likelihood of daytime truck crashes increased by 0.029 
percents at the significance level of 5%, while the probability of daytime non-truck crashes did not 
change significantly (Columns 2-3). By contrast, we do not find any significant changes in the 
probability of night crashes due to an additional post-fracking well (Columns 4-6). The results 
indicate that fracking-related fatal accidents were mainly concentrated in the daytime rather than 
the night. The findings align with our previous conclusion that the increased crashes were caused 
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by a higher traffic amount since daytime traffic is usually much higher than the nighttime volume 
(Romen and Shurtz, 2016).   
We then define rush hours to be anytime during 6am-10am or 4pm-8pm of a day 
inclusively. We use the same model specification to examine changes in the likelihoods of rush-
hour crashes and non-rush crashes. Column 7 of Table 6 shows that an additional post-fracking 
well increased the likelihood of rush-hour crashes by 0.037 percents, which is statistically 
significant at the 10% level. In particular, the probability of large-truck crashes in rush hours 
increased by 0.026 percents with an additional post-fracking well nearby at the significance level 
of 10% (Column 8). The findings indicate that fracking-related transport significantly increased 
the chance of fatal crashes involving large trucks during the rush hours. An additional post-
fracking well also increased the incidence of non-rush crashes by 0.027 percents at the 10% level, 
which could include both large-truck or non-truck crashes during the non-rush hours. The lack of 
evidence of crashes concentrating in the rush hours indicates that the traffic impacts of fracking-
related transport were unlikely to be affected by commute vehicles that usually emerged from the 
rush hours of the day.   
 
4.5.3 Driver Characteristics 
Finally, we examine the potential changes in drivers’ characteristics due to the effects of fracking 
operations. As oil and gas operations take place near a road segment, an increasing number of 
drivers working in the energy industry may be concentrated on the road, which could alter the 
composition of the pool of drivers. In particular, since oil and gas workers are often young men, 
drivers near the fracking well sites may be more likely to run into traffic crashes (Massie, 
Campbell, and Williams, 1995). Thus, we estimate the association between well operations and 
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the demographic features, driving behaviors, license qualification, and driving history of the 
drivers involved in the accidents. Specifically, we merge the vehicle- and the driver-level 
information with the crashes to obtain a sample of drivers. We then merge the well operations 
status with the driver-level sample by the road segments where the crashes happened. Thus, each 
observation is a driver involved in a crash, including 565 drivers in 340 crashes on 228 road 
segments in total. While we control for the county by year and the month by year fixed effects, we 
exclude the road segment fixed effects since among all the crash roads 174 road segments only 
had one crash during the sampling period.  
Table 7 reports the results of the baseline model using the driver-level sample. We do not 
identify any significant effects of well operations on the probability of such demographic features 
as male driver, work injuries, and drivers younger than 24 (Columns 1-3). Instead, in Column 7 
we do find that one more post-fracking well increased the likelihood of drowsy driving by 0.32 
percent at the 10% level, which means that drivers were more likely to be sleepy, asleep, or 
fatigued when the fatal accidents happened. However, we do not find any significant increase in 
the likelihoods of other risky driving behaviors such as speeding, drinking, omitting safety belt 
use, and careless driving (talking, eating, or car phones). Neither do we find any significant 
increase in the chance of holding an invalid license (Columns 9-11) or inferior driving history 
(Columns 12-16).  
 
4.6 Conclusions  
This study identifies a causal relationship between fracking-related trucking and road traffic deaths 
using evidence from North Dakota. We find that transport activities after fracking a well not only 
increased the count of fatal crashes but also resulted in more severe accidents. The impacts can be 
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explained by a higher traffic volume but not by a higher accident rate or risky driving behaviors. 
Our analysis indicates that fracking-induced truck traffic significantly increased the incidence of 
road fatalities in the oil and gas industry, where the traffic death rate had already been six times 
the rate in all sectors before the fracking boom (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2011). 
The findings call for the active involvement of policymakers and oil and gas operators in seeking 
ways to improve workplace safety of the energy sector as well as to mitigate the externalities of 
fracking operations to fellow road users.  
Our findings shed light on risk management strategies for both operators and local 
governments to manage the threats of fracking-induced trucking to road safety. We show that the 
peak traffic effects take place right after the well completion phase during which a substantial 
number of trucks are needed to transport fracking liquid waste. To reduce the road use impacts, oil 
and gas operators may redistribute the traffic loads over time to avoid intense water hauling during 
the peak hours. Operators can also improve water supply system to reduce the trucking demand by 
constructing water wells serving multiple well pads via a piping system. Moreover, they may want 
to develop the onsite wastewater treatment and disposal facilities as opposed to trucking 
wastewater over a long distance. Since we identify that the fracking-related crashes mostly 
happened in the daytime, local governments may take approaches such as reserved truck lanes at 
certain hours, an analogy to high-occupancy vehicle (HOV) lanes. An active traffic alert and 
warning system with live well operations updates could also help road users to monitor traffic and 
avoid exposure to hazards. Finally, our study contributes to the discussion on the well-level 
Pigouvian tax that may be charged to internalize the costs of fracking-induced water transport 
(Black, McCoy, and Weber, 2018). 
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This study draws the public attention to the hidden costs of truck transport borne by the 
fracking boomtowns besides the economic gains on income and employment (Allcott and 
Keniston, 2017; Maniloff and Mastromanaco, 2014; Feyrer, Mansur, and Sacerdote, 2017), which 
contributes to a broader picture of the overall costs and benefits of the U.S. oil and gas boom. In 
addition to the direct fatality and injury loss quantified in this study, indirect costs occur as well 
regarding local emergency medical services and the maintenance and replacement of traffic 
infrastructure, which are beyond the scope of this study but demand future research. Overall, our 
findings are informative for policymakers to weigh the costs and benefits when deciding whether 
to allow the use of fracking and planning future shale development.  
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4.7 Tables and Figures 
Table 4.1 Summary Statistics  
 Mean Standard Deviation Min Max 
Fatal Auto-vehicle Crashes 
#Total crash 0.002 0.048 0 2 
#Truck crash 0.001 0.031 0 2 
#Non-truck crash 0.001 0.036 0 1 
#Daytime crash 0.001 0.038 0 1 
#Night crash  0.001 0.028 0 1 
#Rush-hour crash 0.001 0.033 0 1 
#Non-rush hour crash 0.001 0.034 0 1 
#Total crash loss ($) 26,362 605,252 0 37,030,000 
#Truck crash loss ($) 11,028 394,098 0 37,030,000 
#Non-truck crash loss ($) 15,334 457,263 0 33,736,400 
#Total crash severity ($) 12,778 291,639 0 9,200,000 
#Truck crash severity ($) 4,494 155,751 0 9,200,000 
#Non-truck crash severity ($) 8,315 247,008 0 9,200,000 
     
#Wells in the baseline buffer of six miles 
#Spudding 0.574 1.615 0 36 
#Spudding, horizontal 0.565 1.612 0 36 
#Spudding, vertical 0.009 0.114 0 14 
#Completed 0.577 1.679 0 36 
#Completed, horizontal 0.567 1.672 0 36 
#Completed, vertical 0.01 0.143 0 27 
#Producing 39.686 52.309 0 697 
#Producing, horizontal 21.609 42.783 0 697 
#Producing, vertical 18.078 23.375 0 174 
    150,336 
Notes: This table reports the summary statistics of a balanced panel of road segments by 
year-month from 2006 to 2014. The fatal traffic crashes in our sample occurred within 300 
feet from the centerline of a road segment. The baseline buffer of six miles is estimated to 
be the approximate distance cutoff of an average road segment beyond which well 
operations no longer affect the traffic status on the road.  
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Table 4.2 Effects of Fracking-related Transport on Crash Count 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 #Total crash #Large-truck crash #Non-truck crash 
#Fracking -0.004 0.014 -0.030 
 (0.025) (0.034) (0.040) 
#Post-fracking 0.066*** 0.072** 0.058 
 (0.024) (0.031) (0.040) 
#Spudding 0.027 0.026 0.036 
 (0.024) (0.038) (0.041) 
#Producing -0.005* -0.004 -0.004 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) 
    
Observations 21,720 7,368 14,268 
Year-season FE YES YES YES 
Year-county FE YES YES YES 
Road segment FE YES YES YES 
Notes: This table reports the estimation results of a fixed-effect Poisson model 
using the 2006-2014 road segment by year-month panel data. The estimates 
are based on the baseline buffer of six miles. The dependent variables are the 
count of each type of crashes. Fracking wells are defined as horizontal wells 
completed in the current month. Post-fracking wells are defined as horizontal 
wells completed in the last month. Spudding and producing wells refer to 
newly drilled wells and actively producing wells, respectively, which include 
both horizontal and vertical wells. Observations are dropped in the cases where 
the county of a year did not have any crashes on any road, or the road segments 
never had any crash during the sampling period. Standard errors clustered at 
the road segment level are reported in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1  
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Table 4.3 Robustness Checks 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Poisson model  
without road segment FE 
Vertical wells  
as counterfactual 
Persistent effects  
of fracking 
#𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑖,𝑡 (H) -0.011 -0.004 0.008 
 (0.023) (0.026) (0.025) 
#𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑖,𝑡 (V)  0.061  
  (0.163)  
#𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑖,𝑡−1 (H) 0.059** 0.066*** 0.067*** 
 (0.023) (0.024) (0.025) 
#𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑖,𝑡−1 (V)  -0.597  
  (0.846)  
#𝑆𝑝𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡 0.047* 0.027 0.026 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) 
#𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑖,𝑡 0.002 -0.005* -0.003 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) 
#𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑖,𝑡+1(H)   0.001 
   (0.026) 
#𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑖,𝑡−2 (H)   -0.026 
   (0.024) 
    
Observations 118,707 21,720 21,426 
Year-season FE YES YES YES 
Year-county FE YES YES YES 
Road segment FE NO YES YES 
Notes: This table reports the estimation results of a fixed-effect Poisson model using the 
2006-2014 road segment by year-month panel data. The estimates are based on the baseline 
buffer of six miles. The dependent variables are the count of total fatal crashes. Column 1 
reports the estimation results of a Poisson model excluding road segment fixed effects, 
where observations are dropped in the cases where the season of a year or the county of a 
year did not have any crashes on any road. Column 2-3 report the estimation results of the 
fixed-effect Poisson models, where observations are further dropped in the cases where the 
road segments never had a crash during the sampling period. Standard errors clustered at 
the road segment level are reported in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table 4.4 Effects of Fracking-related Transport on Monetary Loss 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Total Monetary Loss Monetary Loss per Person 
 Total  
crash 
Large-truck  
crash 
Non-truck  
crash 
Total  
crash 
Large-truck  
crash 
Non-truck  
crash 
#Fracking -0.002 -0.000 -0.001 -0.002 -0.000 -0.001 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
#Post-fracking 0.011** 0.007** 0.004 0.010** 0.007** 0.003 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
#Spudding 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.002 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) 
#Producing 0.00002 0.00007 -0.00007 0.00003 0.00007 -0.00006 
 (0.00023) (0.00019) (0.00015) (0.00022) (0.00018) (0.00015) 
       
Observations 150,336 150,336 150,336 150,336 150,336 150,336 
Year-month FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year-county FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Road segment FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Notes: This table reports the estimation results of a log-linear model using the 2006-2014 road segment 
by year-month panel data. The estimates are based on the baseline buffer of six miles. The dependent 
variables in Columns 1-3 are the Inverse Hyperbolic Sine (IHS) transformation of the total monetary loss 
of fatalities and injuries involved in each type of crashes. The dependent variables in Columns 4-6 are 
the IHS transformation of the monetary loss per person of the crashes. Each type of wells follow the same 
definition in Table 2. Standard errors clustered at the road segment level are reported in parentheses *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table 4.5 Effects of Fracking-related Transport on Traffic Volume and Accident Rate  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Annual  
traffic counts 
Total  
crash rate 
Truck  
crash rate 
Non-truck  
crash rate 
#Fracking 0.003*** 0.003 0.003 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
#Spudding -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
#Producing 0.001** -0.002 -0.002 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
     
Observations 5,543 5,541 5,541 5,541 
Year-county FE YES YES YES YES 
Road segment FE YES YES YES YES 
Notes: This table reports the estimation results of a log-linear model using the 
2011-2014 road segment by year panel data. The estimates are based on the 
baseline buffer of six miles. The dependent variables in Columns 1-4 are the 
IHS transformation of the annual traffic counts, total crash rate, truck crash 
rate, and non-truck crash rate, respectively. The crash rates are measured by 
the count of fatal crashes per million vehicle miles traveled (VMT). Fracking 
wells are defined as horizontal wells completed in the current year. Spudding 
and producing wells refer to newly drilled wells in the current year and 
actively producing wells since the last year, respectively, which include both 
horizontal and vertical wells. Standard errors clustered at the road segment 
level are reported in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table 4.6 Timing of the Increased Fatal Crashes 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Daytime 
crash 
Daytime 
truck crash 
Daytime 
non-truck crash 
Night 
crash 
Night 
truck crash 
Night 
non-truck crash 
#Fracking -0.0240 -0.0107 -0.0132 0.0161 0.0113 0.0048 
 (0.0177) (0.0149) (0.0097) (0.0127) (0.0103) (0.0079) 
#Post-fracking 0.0422** 0.0291** 0.0131 0.0215 0.0126 0.0089 
 (0.0208) (0.0145) (0.0135) (0.0131) (0.0102) (0.0073) 
#Spudding 0.0308 0.0195 0.0113 -0.0033 -0.0054 0.0021 
 (0.0229) (0.0194) (0.0149) (0.0139) (0.0109) (0.0101) 
#Producing 0.0006 0.0007 -0.0000 -0.0006 -0.0003 -0.0003 
 (0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0006) 
       
Observations 150,336 150,336 150,336 150,336 150,336 150,336 
Year-month FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year-county FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Road segment FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Notes: This table reports the estimation results of a linear probability model using the 2006-2014 road segment 
by year-month panel data. The estimates are based on the baseline buffer of six miles. The dependent variables 
are the count of fatal crashes of each type labeled in the column title. Each type of wells follows the same 
definition in Table 2. Standard errors clustered at the road segment level are reported in parentheses *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table 4.6 Timing of the Increased Fatal Crashes (Continued) 
 (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 Rush-hour  
crash 
Rush-hour  
truck crash 
Rush-hour  
non-truck crash 
Non-rush  
crash 
Non-rush  
truck crash 
Non-rush  
non-truck crash 
#Fracking -0.0303** -0.0188 -0.0115 0.0224 0.0194 0.0030 
 (0.0150) (0.0121) (0.0091) (0.0147) (0.0119) (0.0085) 
#Post-fracking 0.0365* 0.0263* 0.0103 0.0272* 0.0154 0.0118 
 (0.0194) (0.0136) (0.0125) (0.0150) (0.0110) (0.0091) 
#Spudding 0.0297 0.0148 0.0149 -0.0021 -0.0006 -0.0015 
 (0.0202) (0.0156) (0.0145) (0.0180) (0.0156) (0.0103) 
#Producing 0.0010 0.0008 0.0002 -0.0009 -0.0004 -0.0005 
 (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0009) (0.0006) (0.0007) 
       
Observations 150,336 150,336 150,336 150,336 150,336 150,336 
Year-month FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year-county FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Road segment FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Notes: This table reports the estimation results of a linear probability model using the 2006-2014 road segment 
by year-month panel data. The estimates are based on the baseline buffer of six miles. The dependent variables 
are the count of fatal crashes of each type labeled in the column title. Each type of wells follows the same 
definition in Table 2. Standard errors clustered at the road segment level are reported in parentheses *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table 4.7 Driver Characteristics 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Male Work 
injury 
Younger  
than 24 
Speeding Drinking No belt Drowsy 
driving 
Careless 
driving 
#Fracking -0.0066 -0.0057 -0.0034 0.0010 0.0093 0.0006 -0.0008 -0.0012 
 (0.0071) (0.0069) (0.0084) (0.0007) (0.0110) (0.0014) (0.0006) (0.0010) 
#Post-fracking 0.0082 0.0007 -0.0167 -0.0009 -0.0044 -0.0016 0.0032* 0.0010 
 (0.0093) (0.0058) (0.0103) (0.0006) (0.0118) (0.0039) (0.0018) (0.0014) 
#Spudding 0.0021 0.0060 0.0056 0.0003 -0.0040 -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0010 
 (0.0057) (0.0053) (0.0088) (0.0004) (0.0107) (0.0014) (0.0003) (0.0011) 
#Producing 0.0002 0.0000 -0.0002 -0.0000 0.0005 -0.0000 -0.0001* 0.0002 
 (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0000) (0.0007) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
         
Observations 565 565 565 565 565 565 565 565 
R-squared 0.388 0.294 0.355 0.708 0.389 0.704 0.475 0.757 
Year-month FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year-county FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Notes: This table reports the estimation results of a linear probability model using the driver-level sample. 
The estimates are based on the baseline buffer of six miles. The dependent variables are dummies indicating 
each type of drivers labeled in the column title. Each type of wells follows the same definition in Table 2. 
Standard errors clustered at the road segment level are reported in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table 4.7 Driver Characteristics (Continued) 
 (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
 Valid  
license 
License  
compliance  
with class  
of vehicle 
License  
compliance  
with 
restrictions 
Previous  
recorded  
crashes 
Previous  
suspensions  
&revocations 
Previous  
DWI  
convictions 
Previous 
speeding  
convictions 
Previous  
other  
convictions 
#Fracking 0.0022 0.0016 0.0030 0.0014 -0.0039 0.0009 -0.0034 0.0045 
 (0.0095) (0.0094) (0.0022) (0.0091) (0.0071) (0.0054) (0.0091) (0.0084) 
#Post-fracking 0.0101 0.0079 0.0007 -0.0044 -0.0022 -0.0038 0.0008 0.0040 
 (0.0079) (0.0084) (0.0020) (0.0079) (0.0110) (0.0066) (0.0117) (0.0097) 
#Spudding -0.0011 -0.0046 -0.0003 0.0001 0.0025 0.0026 -0.0000 -0.0126* 
 (0.0105) (0.0098) (0.0010) (0.0055) (0.0074) (0.0065) (0.0100) (0.0069) 
#Producing -0.0010* -0.0009 0.0000 0.0002 0.0001 0.0000 -0.0004 0.0001 
 (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0001) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0005) 
         
Observations 565 565 565 565 565 565 565 565 
R-squared 0.388 0.373 0.287 0.317 0.362 0.486 0.319 0.321 
Year-month FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year-county FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Notes: This table reports the estimation results of a linear probability model using the driver-level sample. The estimates 
are based on the baseline buffer of six miles. The dependent variables are dummies indicating each type of drivers labeled 
in the column title. Each type of wells follows the same definition in Table 2. Standard errors clustered at the road segment 
level are reported in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Figure 4.1 
A. Operational Phases of Conventional Oil and Gas Wells 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                  
 
 
 
B. Operational Phases of Shale Oil and Gas Wells 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                       
 
 
Notes: Created by authors using information by DrillingInfo (2014) and Muehlenbachs, Staubli, and Chu 
(2017)  
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Figure 4.2 Illustration of Buffers of A Road Segment by Distance 
 
Notes: The figure illustrates buffers by distance for the selected road segment.  
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Figure 4.3 Time Trends of the Number of Fracking Wells and Fatal Auto-vehicle Crashes, 
2001-2014 
 
Source: Created by authors using data from the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration and the 
Drillinginfo.  
Notes: The figure plots the annual number of fracking wells and the annual count of fatal traffic crashes by 
vehicle type in the oil and gas producing counties of North Dakota. Fracking wells are defined as the 
horizontal wells completed in each year.  
 
  
129 
 
Figure 4.4 Oil and Gas Wells and Fatal Auto-vehicle Crashes on Highways in North 
Dakota  
 
Source: Created by authors using the highway shapefiles from the Highway Performance Monitoring 
System, the fatal auto-vehicle crashes data from the Fatality Analysis Reporting System, and the geographic 
location of wells from the DrillingInfo data.  
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Figure 4.5 Search for the Baseline Buffer Cutoff 
 
Notes: We divide the buffer of each road segment by twelve rings and estimate the effects of well 
operations in each ring on the count of large-truck crashes in one fixed-effect Poisson regression. The 
figure plots the coefficient estimates and the 95% confidence intervals of the number of post-fracking 
wells in each ring.  
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Figure 4.6 Seasonal Pattern in Fatal Traffic Crashes and Wells Operations 
 
Notes: The figure plots the count of fatal traffic crashes and the number of spudding and fracking wells in 
our sample by month over a one-year cycle. Spudding wells are defined as wells newly drilled in each 
month. Fracking wells are defined as horizontal wells completed in each month.  
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Figure 4.7 The Distance-decaying Effects of Wells’ Post-fracking Activities 
Notes: The figure compiles the estimates from twelve fixed-effect Poisson regressions, which use twelve 
buffers with the borders ranging from one to twelve miles, respectively. The figure plots the coefficient 
estimates and the 95% confidence intervals for the number of post-fracking wells within the buffer.  
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSIONS  
 
This dissertation applies econometric methods and spatial techniques to answer three questions 
regarding the socioeconomic consequences of the U.S. fracking boom: (1) how does oil and gas 
pipeline transport hazards affect mortgage credit access in the real estate market? (2) how does 
unconventional drilling and production techniques affect wastewater generation regarding the 
lifespan production pattern and the production efficiency? and (3) how does fracking-related 
trucking activities affect the accident externality?  
The first essay demonstrates a permanently lower origination rate by 1.9% in the pipeline-
present areas compared to the pipeline-free areas, which is shown to result from lenders’ concerns 
about collateral value and borrowers’ repayment ability. The permanent difference in credit access 
was further enlarged by 1.8% when pipeline incidents happened, which indicates lenders’ aversion 
to the potential environmental liabilities. The essay identifies that it is the lower-income borrowers 
that are subject to the credit loss due to pipeline hazards while mortgage lenders’ management 
strategies always responded to the tightening of the securitization market.  
The second essay shows that horizontal wells drilled in shale regions after 2010 produced 
an increasingly larger amount of wastewater at the initial stage of production relative to vertical 
wells while the difference between them decreased with production age regardless of cohort years. 
However, unconventional wells tended to have a lower lifespan cumulative wastewater and a lower 
wastewater-to-energy ratio.  
The third essay shows that wells’ trucking activities within one month after the fracking 
phase increased the count of fatal crashes involving large trucks by 7.5% and induced more 
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fatalities and more critical injuries. Moreover, the increased crashes emerged during both rush and 
non-rush hours in the daytime but not in the night. Evidence suggests that the increased accidents 
were due to a higher traffic amount rather than a higher accident rate or risky driving behaviors.  
Several conclusions obtained from this dissertation are worthy of special attention. First, 
as this dissertation identifies the population who suffer from the credit loss when pipeline hazards 
are present, this essay promotes public discussion on the environmental injustice existing in the 
fracking boom. Future attempts on this topic can be made to further investigate the distribution of 
fracking wells and waste injection sites across neighborhoods with residents of different race, 
color, and income. Next, in contrast to the anecdotal evidence and prevailing perceptions, our 
rigorous lifespan analysis shows that the fracking technology turns out to be more efficient than 
conventional oil and gas production methods in the long run. Moreover, the constant technological 
improvements over time will eventually enable the U.S. to get rid of the dependence on oil import 
and dirty fuel resources. However, the real concerns should lie in the associated risk management 
strategies, which usually lag because of the unique production pattern and the unprecedented scale 
of the shale oil and gas boom. The elevated accident externality induced by fracking, for instance, 
may exist as a long-term road safety hazard considering the periodic nature of fracking activities, 
the large scale of drilling, and the huge resource potential throughout the nation. The findings of 
the dissertation thus inform policymakers of effective risk management practices to alleviate the 
socioeconomic costs that may occur in the future shale energy development.   
 
